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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Homeland Security is deploying the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC) to U.S. ports to help ensure only authorized individuals 
having undergone background checks have access to secure areas.  Congress mandated 
the TWIC have a biometric authenticator; DHS chose fingerprints. 
This thesis argues iris scanning is a better choice because of the nature of the 
maritime environment and because iris scanning is a more accurate biometric. This thesis 
also argues there are social factors affecting a biometric–enabled identification card 
which must be considered for the program to be successful. 
To investigate the issue of biometrics and the TWIC, this thesis performed a field 
study of an iris scanner; a survey of biometric attitudes, and interviews with members of 
the PMA and the ILWU. The iris study operated the scanner in an identification mode, 
experiencing no false acceptances and few false rejects; however it found the scanner 
sensitive to sun position with respect to the subject. The pilot study of attitudes found 
subjects supportive of biometrics in scenarios currently requiring positive identification, 
but opposing them when it would create new requirements for identification.  Both pilot 
studies were impacted by an inability to provide an incentive to study subjects. 
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This thesis examines how iris scanning could improve the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC) program.  This thesis conducted two pilot studies: a 
field usability study of the SecuriMetrics PIER 2.3 Iris device and a study of biometric 
attitudes.  Both studies were hampered by the inability to provide adequate incentives to 
obtain greater numbers of volunteers.  Nevertheless, the conclusions of both studies were 
consistent with other research in this area.  
Iris scanning has the potential, if implemented correctly, to drastically improve 
the accuracy of identification of workers in security sensitive positions. Applied to 
transportation workers at U.S. ports, iris scanning could considerably reduce the chances 
of an unauthorized individual gaining access to sensitive areas, making the shipping port 
less vulnerable to attack.  
Iris scanning is a “stand-off” biometric, meaning that it requires no physical 
contact between the subject and the iris scanning device. The accuracy of iris scanning 
appears to be vastly superior to other forms of biometrics.  Daugman claims that with 
millions of scans performed, there have been zero false matches with iris scanning [9].   
Even if this is an overstatement of the accuracy of iris scanning, there is no doubt that iris 
scanning is vastly superior to the other methods of “stand-off” biometrics, including 
facial recognition and gait recognition which have traditionally had significant error rates 
[41].  
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program will 
require the use of biometrics at U.S. shipping port facilities for identity verification. Great 
care must be taken in the shipping port environment to minimize the time required to 
collect and process a biometric if they are to be used for identification purposes on a daily 
basis.  Any method that would slow the entry or exit of dock workers or truckers in or out 
of the port would have an impact on the efficiency of the port itself, resulting in higher 
prices of all shipped goods.  
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Any major disruption to the normal operation of U.S. port facilities would likely 
have a noticeable impact on the U.S. economy.  For example a 2002 labor dispute which 
led to a 10 day shutdown of West Coast port operations cost the U.S. economy an 
estimated $1.5 billion daily [3]. 
Mr. George Cumming, the Director of Homeland Security for the Port of Los 
Angeles, in his May 2006 testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science 
and Transportation, noted that he expects the amount of commerce at the Port of Los 
Angles will continue to grow at 20% per year, and that the industry as a whole will 
double by 2020 [5].  
Current plans are to use fingerprints as the biometric to validate the identity of 
TWIC card holders.  Fingerprint scanners are likely to experience significant challenges 
in the unique conditions that the marine environment and a gated facility present.  Some 
of these challenges could be addressed through the use of iris recognition and the 
adoption of very recent product developments in iris technology. 
Iris scanning has the potential to allow the collection of a biometric for 
identification or verification purposes at a moderate distance and even through wind-
shields or windows of vehicles.  This might significantly reduce the impact that the 
adoption of biometric identification requirement will have on U.S. shipping ports, by 
allowing the collection of the iris scan without requiring the driver to get out of the 
vehicle and maybe even without stopping. 
Recent developments in iris scanning are moving this biometric technology 
quickly to a point where iris scanning may be the biometric of choice to achieve both 
high rates of accuracy and high speed of collection of a biometric for identity 
establishment or verification.   
A. BIOMETRICS IN THE POST – SEPTEMBER 2001 ERA 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 left the Nation in shock and made it clear that 
the freedom of movement Americans enjoy in the United States may come with a price 
— vulnerability.  In a society that prides itself in the ease at which its citizens are able to 
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travel and a low level of government involvement in the daily lives of its citizens, we 
became very aware of how those freedoms may provide our enemies opportunities to 
exploit.   
That day forced America to ask if the freedom of movement and levels of privacy 
its citizen enjoy are worth the risk that freedom and privacy come with.  Some argue that 
those attacks and the lives lost that day are the price that must be paid for those freedoms.  
Others argue that the price is too high and that privacy should not be guaranteed at any 
price, especially at the cost of thousands of civilian lives.  Some would go so far as to say 
the only reason an individual seeks anonymity is to do things that are illegal and that any 
law abiding citizen should not have any fear of the government knowing what they are up 
to and where they have been. This thesis examines how the public views biometrics and 
looks for commonalities in what uses of biometrics are deemed acceptable and where the 
use of such technology crosses that line of the public’s perceived right to privacy.  
B. TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL 
1. Origins of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 also brought great attention to the fact that 
some U.S. centers of transportation were at risk.  It pushed those concerns to the very 
front of the agenda of the U.S. Congress.  Shortly after the attack, Congress passed the 
Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) and the Maritime Transportation Security 
Act (MTSA) in an effort to address two vulnerabilities.  These Acts direct today’s 
Department of Homeland Security to secure the U.S. Airports and Shipping Ports.  Both 
of these Acts require the use of background checks on all personnel needing unescorted 
access to secure areas of either U.S. airports or U.S. shipping facilities. They also created 
the requirement that once cleared, these individuals will be issued identification that 
would be difficult to counterfeit, difficult to alter, and biometrically verifiable.  
The DHS chose to move forward with its efforts to provide the newly required 
identification at U.S. shipping facilities first.  Because of the economic importance of 
maritime shipping facilities to the overall U.S. economy, anything that might impact the 
 4
efficiency of these ports and their operations has potential to have a significant impact to 
the U.S. economy.  The decisions surrounding which form(s) of biometric verification 
should be used to achieve the required verification should take into account the potential 
adverse impact the biometric collection method will have on the shipping facilities.  
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program is intended 
to help meet the requirement of those laws by providing a biometrically verifiable 
identification token that is cryptographically protected from counterfeiting and alteration 
[11]. The idea is straight forward: if an individual passes the background screening and if 
it can be verified that the TWIC card itself has not be altered and that the holder is the 
individual identified on the card, then one can be reasonably certain that the individual 
holding the card is trusted to have access to whatever the TWIC card provides.  This is 
intended to increase the security of the transportation infrastructure of the United States. 
The TWIC is intended to be issued to all personnel who need unescorted access to 
the secure areas of U.S. shipping ports, some vessels, and eventually to U.S. airports as 
well.  A secure area is any area beyond the gate to the port facility. DHS has also 
identified some ships as having “secure areas” and workers on these ships will also need 
to have TWIC cards to maintain unescorted access to these areas. The TWIC will be 
required for all dock workers (longshoremen), truckers who transport freight in and out of 
the ports, delivery drivers (UPS, vending machines, food, etc.), Port Authority personnel, 
and those who work on the ships and require access to secure areas of the ships and so 
on.  In all, DHS estimates that over 770,000 personnel will eventually need to be issued a 
TWIC. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
The TWIC card itself is intended to serve as a model for the form of identification 
mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12) [11].  The TWIC 
program will eventually require the use of a biometric card reader.  In January 2007, the 
TSA and USCG issued the first TWIC rule that mandates that workers who require 
unescorted access to secure areas of maritime facilities be enrolled in the TWIC program 
and that procedures be changed to ensure those seeking unescorted access have a valid 
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TWIC card [57].  However, neither the TSA nor Coast Guard requirements mandated any 
specific biometric card readers.  This was in direct response to the request for public 
comments on the draft of its first rule.  In particular the American Association of Port 
Authorities (AAPA), the group who owns and operates most U.S. shipping facilities, 
noted that most biometric systems have not been tested in a maritime environment and 
that these systems should be tested and certified for use in such an environment before 
being required [57].  The problem is that very few biometric readers have been tested in 
the maritime environment. 
In its April 12, 2007 report to the U.S. Senate, the TSA noted that the industry 
would face challenges with implementation of TWIC.  In the test and pilot programs very 
few sites tested the biometric card readers that are required by the MTSA.  This provided 
very little information on how this sort of readers would handle the “dirt, salt, wind and 
rain” of the maritime environment [3].  
Challenges are also sure to arise when biometric readers are installed on shipping 
vessels which could again prove to be a unique environment with no tests of biometric 
readers having been conducted in this environment either [4]. Shipboard readers will 
present a challenge of “reach-back” over wireless (most likely satellite communications) 
channels; and there has been no test of how these connections will be made.  
D. IRIS SCANNING IN A PORT ENVIRONMENT 
Ensuring the accuracy of identification and biometric verification is of substantial 
interest to the security of the United States. It is in the economic best interest of the 
nation to ensure that this process of checking IDs and physically obtaining a biometric to 
establish or confirm the identity of the identification holder be made as efficient as 
possible. 
In a telephone interview, Mr. Cummings, the Director of Homeland Security for 
the Port of Los Angeles, indicated that the use of the TWIC card with the requirement for 
a biometric verification of the holder would be of great concern at the port’s entry.  While 
the current requirement is that a guard must visually verify the identity of the holder, 
once the biometric check is enforced, the increased processing could cause considerable 
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delay and backup of traffic attempting to enter the port facility.  He also indicated that 
while the current direction of the TSA was to use fingerprints, that given the limited 
experience anyone had with fingerprint scanners in a maritime environment that the 
dependability of the scanner was also of great interest.  
E. TWIC TO USE FINGERPRINTS AS BIOMETRIC 
1. Decision to Use Fingerprints as Biometric of Verification  
The TWIC Final Rule issued on 25 January 2007 made fingerprints the biometric 
to be used by the TWIC program.  The use of fingerprints will facilitate the background 
check process as fingerprints can be matched against the FBI criminal databases and the 
fingerprint templates will be stored directly on the TWIC Card [57].   
F. IRIS SCANNING AS AN EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE  
1. Why Iris Scanning Might Make More Sense 
Iris scanning as a biometric makes more sense for the TWIC given the 
requirements for high speed and operation in the hostile maritime environments.  The big 
advantage of fingerprints — compatibility with existing biometric databases — is not 
relevant here. With fingerprint scanners the subject must make physical contact with the 
scanner for the print to be acquired.  In the gated facility scenario in which the TWIC will 
be used, this means the subject who is driving the vehicle must bring the vehicle to a 
complete stop.  The subject must then physically reach outside of the vehicle to make 
contact with the fingerprint scanner, or the fingerprint scanner must be moved into the 
vehicle to facilitate the physical action of the fingerprint scan. 
The port environment also provides for a couple of scenarios that could make 
fingerprint scanning more challenging than usual.  The port environment includes bodies 




still experience a common side effect of working in wet environments: wrinkled or 
shriveled fingers.  Here again iris scanning would prove far more reliable if wrinkles 
cause issues with fingerprint scanners.  
Fingerprint scanners also require that the subject make physical contact with the 
fingerprint scanner itself.  This brings up issues of sanitation due to the constant contact 
by multiple individuals [54].  Port facilities tend not to be the cleanest environment.  
Shipboard workers, especially those who work on the ship power-plants (engines) are 
exposed to grease or other petroleum based contaminants.  This will certainly present a 
challenge to the reliability of fingerprint scanners. 
2. The Promise of Iris Scanning at a Distance 
Here is where iris scanning may hold the most promise.   “Iris-at-a-Distance” is 
the set of technologies that allows an iris scanner to acquire an iris scan of a subject at a 
considerably greater distance than the current norm for an iris scanner.  Some research in 
this area has shown potential for this at distances of up to one meter, even while the 
subject is moving [21][22][26].  The Sarnoff Corporation has introduced an indoor iris 
scanner that is capable of capturing irises from individuals walking at distances of up to 
three meters [24]. Just in November 2007, Sarnoff announced a “drive-through” iris 
scanning system [25].  
If iris-at-a-distance technologies can become financially practical this could 
potentially eliminate the requirement for a vehicle driver to come to a complete stop at a 
gated facility.  Policy is not likely to allow for “roll-by” entry through a gate. However, 
iris-at-a-distance technologies could eliminate the need for most drivers to dismount their 
vehicle to provide a biometric scan, while making the scan as easy as looking in a 
particular direction. 
G. PRIVACY CONCERNS OF TWIC PROGRAM 
There are privacy concerns with the TWIC program, just as there are with any 
program that requires collection of large amounts of personally identifiable information 
about people. The DHS Inspector General released a report [1] that highlighted some of 
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these concerns, which are one of the reasons that the program has been delayed [2].  One 
concern is that the TWIC program does not have any data retention policies governing 
the length of time data is stored or any procedures for removing data from TWIC 
databases when it is no longer needed [2]. 
A second area of research in this thesis is the current public opinion toward the 
acceptability of biometrics in some specific scenarios. The TWIC program will likely 
move forward using a biometric scan for verification without any roadblocks caused by 
general public concern over biometric use because it does not apply to the general public.  
However, it will need to address the opinions and mistrust of the workers who must be 
issued the TWIC, or else workers may seek to subvert the program.  
The TWIC is intended to meet the requirements of HSPD-12 which mandated the 
use of “secure and reliable form of identification” [11] to all government employees and 
contractors.  The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 201 provides the 
standard for how the HSPD-12 forms of identification should be implemented and 
requires the use of biometrics [13].  Given the large number of individuals HSPD-12 will 
effect (all U.S. Government employees and contractors), and the FIPS-201 requirement 
for the use of biometrics, the experience of the government with the TWIC may be 
directly applicable to some future HSPD-12 systems. 
Another specific challenge for the TWIC card and biometrics comes from the 
unionized longshoremen who work at the port facilities on the West Coast.  The union 
sees the TWIC as a method for the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) to better track 
the hours being worked by the longshoremen.  One requirement of the MTSA is that port 
operators should know who is in their port at all times [17].  If the TWIC card is used to 
facilitate this, then undoubtedly there is a record kept of all entries and exit to the facility 
along with times of entry and departure.  It is not a far leap of the imagination that this 
information could be used to establish a “time-clock” of sorts for dock workers.   
The union ensures that union members will be paid for a full eight hour work day 
even if the job they do for the day does not take the full eight hours [14][61].  Some job 
in particular require the longshoreman to be on the job to perform his assigned tasks early 
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in the day and again late in the day, with no tasks being required of this worker for large 
portions of the time in between. This is an employment issue rather than one of security, 
but it shows some TWIC users may seek to subvert the system for reasons other than 
attacking port security.   
H. PRIVACY CONCERNS AND BIOMETRICS 
In general, concerns about privacy and biometrics include: that the data will be 
used only as advertised, a lack of trust by the general population that the data will be 
properly protected from unintended disclosure and the possible physical risks that the 
collection of biometrics might create, to name a few. 
A 2001 survey showed that there are some situations in which the public is very 
comfortable with biometrics being used. The potential use of biometrics for screening 
individuals seeking access to military bases and laboratories and to screen individuals 
desiring to purchase a fire arm, are two examples where the public is comfortable.  
People also seemed to be fine with the idea of collecting biometrics from convicted 
criminals [15].  The survey also showed that the public appears to be more concerned that 
the data collected for a large biometric system will end up being used for more that 
originally intended than they are with the actual methods for biometric collection. 
More recently TRUSTe conducted a survey that showed 82% of Americans are in 
favor of biometric identification on passports. Seventy-five percent of Americans think 
biometrics are a good idea on driver’s licenses and almost seventy-three percent think 
biometrics would be a good addition to social security cards [20].  This would seem to 
indicate that individuals seem more open to the use of biometrics when it comes to 
protecting their identity. 
I. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS MAY LEAD TO CONCERNS 
Some people are opposed to the use of biometrics on religious grounds. The 
majority of these objections seem to be based on Revelations 13:16-18, which warns of a 
future in which the people of the world will be forced to wear the “Mark of the Beast” in 
order to buy or sell, or to obtain food.  
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For example, while visiting SecuriMetrics/L1-Securities, the manufacture of the 
Iris Scanner used the field experiment, I had a passing conversation with a visitor who 
had stopped by the L1 facilities.  When I ask very casually what he thought about the 
technology that L1 manufactured, he responded, “This technology is the Mark of the 
Beast.” This same connection was drawn by three respondents of the survey that we 
performed, even though there was no mention of the Mark or Revelations on the survey. 
While it is doubtful that iris scanners are truly the fulfillment of prophecy, the 
association between the two appears to be present in some people’s minds. Peter de Jager 
notes that, regardless of how irrational beliefs like that above are or seem to be to 
someone else, they are beliefs for some, and must be considered and addressed if change 
is ever to occur [16].  
J. BIOMETRICS ALONE DO NOT SOLVE ANYTHING 
All the technology can do is to help ensure we limit access only to individuals 
who have been deemed trustworthy [18][19].  A key to the success of the TWIC program 
providing improvements to the security of U.S. shipping port will be the ability of the 
TWIC program to enroll individuals needing TWIC cards into the program and issuing 
TWIC cards to them.  Far more important will be the screening process and criteria that 
will be used to ensure only “trustworthy” individual receive a TWIC card.  The current 
guidelines would disqualify anyone who has been convicted of a felony within the last 7 
years, or release from incarceration for a felony in the last 5 years [17].  One question 
that will affect the TWIC card’s success is whether or not these criteria successfully 
allow the government to identify individuals who represent a threat to the security of the 
Unites States, while not preventing individuals who have a rough past but who are not a 
terrorist threat from pursuing good paying jobs as longshoremen.  Based on interviews 
conducted for this thesis, it is clear that if the TWIC program is seen as disrupting 
livelihoods while not improving overall security, it will not be successful because the 
intended enrollees will work to subvert it. 
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II. IRIS SCANNING: TECHNOLOGY AND USES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Iris Recognition, Technology and History 
In 1993 John Daugman introduced iris scanning as a new biometric.  He did so by 
answering three questions. 1) Were there enough degrees-of-freedom in the iris to use it 
to singularly identify and individual (there were), 2) was it possible to derive an 
algorithm that could efficiently create a match-able iris template form an image (it was) 
and 3) could that algorithm render a match decision with high statistical confidence 
within a reasonable amount of time and with reasonable computing resources (it could) 
[8].  
Daugman’s technique uses a video camera to acquire the iris image.  His 
algorithm first determines if an iris is in the image and if so, then identifies the iris 
position.  The basic process uses the fact that the white of the eye is much whiter than the 
iris itself to establish the outer edge of the iris in an image (outer line).  The inner edge of 
the iris is then established using the fact that, while the pupil might not be much different 
in color form the iris itself, (especially in the case of dark eyes) the pupil is a 









As an aside, Daugman notes that the pupil itself changes diameter nearly 
constantly even in conditions of steady illumination and that this property of the eye can 
be used to create a “liveness” test of a video image being used to test an iris[8].    
Once acquired, iris images are passed through 2-D Gabor filters to produce a 
binary “iris code” of the image.  This results in a 256 byte code or “template” for the iris.  
Even in 1993, the process of calculating this code took just 100 msec on a standard 
computer. 
The original iris code algorithm produced a 256 byte code for each iris.  The size 
of the code was chosen because 256 bytes was consistent with the amount of data that 
could be stored in the magnetic stripe of an IS-7811 credit/debit card[8].   While the 
length of the iris code appears to have been driven by the technology available for an 
anticipated market of the iris algorithm, a key to iris scanning was to achieve a constant 
length code for all irises.  Daugman explained that this property of fixed-length lends 
itself to both the “speed and reliability of iris recognition decisions.”  He also notes that 
the variability in the length of the output of a representation in fingerprints has been a 
complicating factor in the use of that technology for identification [8]. 
One of the greatest claims of Daugman’s study established “the likelihood of two 
iris codes from different irises agreeing completely by chance is roughly one in 2173 , or 
approximately 10-52 [8].” Yet over the years, this claim has help up. 
Once a template has been acquired for a subject it will need to be entered into an 
iris template database.  Here it will remain, waiting to be matched against another 
template. 
To match an iris the system must first capture an image of the iris in question.  
The image is run through the same conversion process to produce a second 256 byte iris 
template.  This new template is then used to search for a “match” in the iris template 
database that contains known irises.   Here a match is a statistical match.  Two images of 
the same iris are not likely to produce the same 256 byte template, due to variations in the 
images themselves.  A match is defined as finding an iris template in the iris template 
database that matches “close enough”. 
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Daugman received a patent for his algorithm in March 1994 [27].  
The match decision is made by computing the Hamming Distance between two 
samples.  The Hamming Distance is the percentage of bits of the known iris code and iris 
scan being tested that do not match [9].  If an iris scan matches 80% with a known 
sample then its Hamming Distance would be 0.20 for that iris code pair. 
2.  Basic Description of Iris Match 
Much as your signature is never quite the same, templates of the same iris will 
differ to some degree due to variations in the “configuration” of the eye, differences in 
position of the camera and possibly due to lighting conditions at the time.  The eye 
“configuration” refers to the size of the pupil (due to lighting or other physical causes that 
would cause to dilate or constrict), the position of an individuals eyelids (which may 
occlude part of, or expose more of the iris than in the original image) or eyelashes or hair 
occluding a part of the iris.   The image may also be slightly distorted by the use of eye 
glasses, sunglasses or contact lenses. 
The new iris template is then run in an exhaustive search of the template database 
looking for a match that is close enough to call it a match.  Here the templates are 
compared on a bit by bit basis to look for correlation.  One might simply XOR the two 
templates together and count the number of 1’s left over, divide that by 2048 (256 bytes * 
8 bit/byte) yielding a simple percentage difference between the two templates.  This 
percentage difference is what Daugman describes as the Hamming Distance between two 
templates. 
Daugman derived a table of Hamming Distance values and the corresponding 
odds of a false match (False Acceptance Rate) and false reject (False Rejection Rate).  He 
suggests that the Hamming Distance required to statistically result in a match can be 
tailored to the given application that an iris recognition system is going to employed in.  
This means that an organization can choose and set the tolerance they are willing to 
accept for their iris system.  For those who are more concerned about the threat 
represented by allowing a false match, the Hamming Distance can be set to a higher level 
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of tolerance, meaning it requires a greater percentage match between the known sample 
and test iris code to result in a “match” [9]. 
 













Table 1.   Performance Tabulated as Error Probabilities for several Decision Criteria 
or Various Hamming Distance  (From [8]) 
 
Daugman states that the process of the statistical matching algorithm itself, when 
comparing a sample iris code to one that has been previously stored, will result in a 
match or a non-match. This leads to one of four possible outcomes:  
Acceptance of Authentic (AA): a result of “Match” on the authentic iris.  More 
simply put, the iris template being tested against (template A) is a statistical match to the 
template (template B) in question.  Here, template B is in fact a template created from the 
same iris that produced template A at some earlier point.  
False Acceptance (FA): a result of “Match” on an imposter iris.  Here the iris 
template in question (template B) is found to be a statistical match to a template 
previously (template A).  However, in this case, templates A and B were generated from 
two different irises. 
False Rejection (FR): a result of “non-match” on the authentic iris. In this case the 
iris template in question template B is not found to statistically match to template A.  In 
this case, templates A and B where generated from the same iris. 
HD Criterion Odds of False Accept Odds of False Reject 
0.25 1 in 13.5 billion 1 in 1,490 
0.26 1 in 2.04 billion 1 in 2,660 
0.27 1 in 339 millin 1 in 4,850 
0.28 1 in 60 million 1 in 9,000 
0.29 1 in 12 million 1 in 17,100 
0.30 1 in 2.4 million 1 in 32,800 
0.31 1 in 603,000 1 in 64,200 
0.32 1 in 151,000 1 in 128,000 
0.33 1 in 39,800 1 in 260,000 
0.34 1 in 11,500 1 in 536,000 
















igher chance of False A
ccept 
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Correct Rejection: a result of “non-match” on an imposter iris.  Here the iris 
template in question (template B) is not a statistical match to the template it is being 
compared to (template A) and in fact templates A and B were generated from two 
different irises. 
In practice, a single acquired template is compared against many templates that 
have been previously collected and stored in a template database.  The template in 
question is compared to templates in the database until either a statistical match is found 
or until all templates in the database are exhausted. 
Daugman showed that with a circa-1993 desktop computer it was possible to 
perform exhaustive searches of an iris database at a rate of about 4,000 templates per 
second. He theorized that a relatively inexpensive specialize circuit would have been able 
to search nearly 160 million iris templates per second exhaustively [8].  
By 2004 [9] the speed at which the iris matching algorithm would run had 
increased substantially.  Today we estimate that a 300-MHZ processor, typical of 
handheld computers and cell phones, is able to compare 100,000 iris templates per 
second; and on a typical 2-GHz desktop, comparisons can be run at a rate in excess of 
580,000 matches per second.  Given the estimated U.S. population of approximately 
303,230,000 [10], it would be possible for this server configuration to do an exhaustive 
comparison of the entire U.S. population in approximately nine minutes (18 minutes if 
both left and right eyes of the population are compared). Since exhaustive search is 
inherently parallel, nine computers could reduce the search to one minute; 90 computers 
could reduce the search time to six seconds.  Of course, no such database of biometrics 
exists today, so such numbers are necessarily theoretical. 
Until recently, iris scanners have been used almost entirely in controlled 
environments such as an office space.  This environment provides some level of 
predictability of environmental factors, in particular the direction and level of light 
intensity of the ambient light that could have an effect on the accuracy of the iris scanner.  
To overcome the limitation that light levels may present, manufactures have incorporated 
infra-red illuminators in some iris scanners.  
 16
Infra-red illumination is used as iris detail is best captured in the infra-red 
wavelength.  At this wavelength (700-900 nm) the effect of dark eye color masking the 
detail of the iris are eliminated [9].  However; iris recognition has been shown to be 
possible using still images taken in the visible wavelengths as well [40]. 
3. False Accepts vs. False Rejects 
As noted above, the Daugman algorithm can have its matching criteria set or 
adjusted to meet the need of the application to which it is being applied.  This provides 
the end customer or equipment manufacturer the ability to customize the system to err on 
the side of  security where the cost of a false accept is deemed very high and the customer 
is therefore willing to accept a significant number of false rejects.  Or the system can be 
set up for the other extreme where having the occasional false identification is deemed 
acceptable given that the systems does not produce many false rejects. 
One can see where the first scenario fits well with applications that require high 
degrees of security, and where the ability to screen out an imposter is far more important 
than the inconvenience created when the system falsely rejects an acceptable individual.  
In these cases procedures can be put in place to handle the occasional false reject. 
A scenario where the occasional miss-identification might be acceptable would be 
where the goal is tracking the frequency that individuals perform a certain action.  Port 
security is probably such an application. 
4. Identification vs. Verification 
Biometrics offer the ability to match an individual against a pre-obtained 
biometric template.  This can be done in one of two methods: to either establish 
someone’s identity, or to simply verify their identity.   
a. Using Biometrics to Establish Identity 
With identification (or identity establishment) the individual in question 
does not need to provide any claim of who they are.  In this case a biometric 
measurement is collected from the individual. That biometric measurement is then 
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converted into a template.  That template is then compared to templates in a database 
(exhaustively or with more intelligent methods).  If a match is found and the matching 
template is tied to an identity (which usually takes place during a registration process) 
then the individual who provided the template in question is determined to be the 
individual indentified in the database.   
On the plus side in this scenario, there is no dependence on the subject to 
provide any claim of identity.  This is a plus with a subject who is intentionally 
attempting to be misleading or who is unable to provide an acceptable claim of identity. 
(Think of an individual using a credit card without any form of picture ID.) 
On the downside: Identity establishment often requires an exhaustive 
search of a biometric template database.  Depending on the size of the database or more 
precisely the number of templates that it must be compared to and the speed at which 
these comparisons can be made this can require considerable resources to perform.   
b. Using Biometrics to Verify Identity 
For identity verification the process begins very similar.  A biometric 
measurement is obtained from the individual in question.  However, in this case the 
individual also provides some manner of claimed identity.  This could be as simple as 
stating their name or as complex as providing a “Smart Card” that contains their identity 
and key into a biometric database. The biometric measurement collected is then turned 
into a template to again be used for comparison.   However, since the individual in 
question has already provided us a claimed identity, in this case the system would 
retrieve only the template of the individual the individual has claimed to be.  Here we 
will only compare the template collected from the individual against the template in the 
biometric database tied to the claimed identity.  If we have a match, then we have 
confirmed the identity of the individual.  This is similar to how an ATM card and PIN 
works.  The ATM card is the claimed identity and the PIN is used to verify the claimed 
identity. 
One advantage of verification is that, by limiting the number of templates 
that must be searched in order to arrive at a conclusion about the validity of the claimed 
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identity, the verification process can be performed faster on less expensive hardware.  
This can save resources and results in a much faster match result.   
One disadvantage of identity verification is that if the claimed identity is 
incorrect, then there is no determination of who the imposter is.  This may be fine if the 
only goal is to not allow authorized individuals access to some protected resource, but 
falls woefully short if there is a need to determine who the imposter is. (Of course 
mismatches could be recorded and identified later.) 
B. CURRENT STATE–OF-THE-ART 
Current iris technology can be grouped into a few different categories.  One could 
separate them by whether the scanning unit is fixed in location or mobile, whether the 
subject being scanned must be relativity still or can be moving or even by the distance the 
iris scanner must be from the subject to obtain a clear image.  This section reviews 
examples of scanners that fall into three distinct groups: Fixed or mounted iris scanners, 
handheld scanners, and iris scanners that can acquire iris images from a reasonable 
distance. 
1. Fixed or Mounted Scanners 
Fixed or mounted iris scanners have been the most common category of iris 
scanners.  These scanners require the subject to bring their iris into close proximity of the 
scanner itself. Close proximity here is approximately 6-12 inches between the scanner 
and the iris whose image is being captured.  A few commercially available examples of 





Figure 1.    Frequent Flyers program at Schiphol Airport in the Netherlands uses the LG 
IrisAccess-2200.  (From [29])  
Fixed or mounted iris scanners are being introduced into many applications.  One 
of the big advantages the fixed scanners provide is that they can be used in an unmanned 
setup when subjects are cooperative.  This has made this particular category of scanners 
useful in office building access and airport settings where the environment tends to be 
more controlled.    The systems are generally connected to a central template database as 
the number of registered users tends to be high.  
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2. Handheld Scanners 
Handheld iris scanners provide the ability to utilize them in applications that 
require the iris scanner to be mobile.   The devices that are available commercially in this 
category tend to be ruggedized as the U.S. military is one of the larger customers.  These 
devices tend to be more suited for the outdoor environment or simply environments 
where there is less control over the conditions.  A couple of examples:  
 
Figure 2.   U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. A.C. Wilson uses a retina scanner to positively 
identify a member of the Baghdaddi city council prior to a meeting with local 
tribal figureheads, sheiks, community leaders and U.S. service members deployed 
with Regimental Combat Team-7 in Baghdaddi, Iraq, on Jan. 10, 2007. Wilson is 
attached to the 4th Civil Affairs Group. (From [50]) 
The SecuriMetrics PIER 2.3 (Portable Iris Enrollment and Recognition Device) is 
the handheld device used in the field experiment in this paper.  This device is lightweight 
and simple to use.  This particular device captures iris images at a distance of 
approximately 4-6 inches [49]. 
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The HIIDE (Hand-held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment) is a multi-
modal scanner with an iris scanner, a fingerprint scanner, and a camera for facial 
recognition, allowing the operator to utilize more than one biometric to establish the 
identity of an individual.  The HIIDE allow a subject in the field to be matched against 
multiple databases containing different kinds of biometric templates.  Alternatively, the 
device allows subjects’ irises, fingerprints and facial templates to be collected in a single 
registration; thus allowing the templates to be interoperable with different systems. 
The HIIDE image capture distance is approx 8-10 inches; the systems can store 
approximately 10,000 biometric portfolios (2 iris templates, 10 fingerprints and a facial 
image). 
3. Iris Recognition on Cell Phones 
In November 2006, OKI announced a successful development in Iris Recognition 
middleware software for use on cell phones [55].  This development has the potential to 
reduce the cost of iris image capture devices, making iris scanners ubiquitous. 
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Figure 3.   OKI's mobile-oriented iris recognition middleware (OKI Electric Industries) 
4. Iris at a Distance 
The last category is that of scanners that can acquire the iris image at a distance. 
This category of scanner opens the door to even less physically intrusive iris image 
capture.  Current scanners in the group are able to capture iris at a distance of up to 10 
feet away[24][25]. 
C. CURRENT DEPLOYED USES 
Iris scanners to date have found themselves used almost entirely in controlled 
environments such as an office space.  This environment provides some level of 
predictability of environmental factors; in particular, ambient light levels that could have 
an effect on the accuracy of the iris scanner.  To overcome this limitation, manufacturers 
have incorporated infra-red illuminators in some iris scanners.  
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More recent applications have moved iris scanners into less controlled 
environments.  In Iraq, the U.S. military is using iris recognition devices like the PIER 
2.3 to provide identification for the purpose of screening Iraqi army recruits.  This 
application is conducted in much less controlled environments [51], although no 
information has been made publically available about the performance of the PIER 2.3 in 
Iraq. 
1. Border Control  
In 2001, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Interior launched an iris 
recognition system to check visitors and individuals on work visas, against a database of 
UAE inmates and expellees.  The system uses iris cameras made by LG and a networked 
server infrastructure system made by Imad Malhas of Iris Guard [53].  The expellee 
database has grown to nearly one million [29].  Visitors’ irises are run against an 
exhaustive search of the database to look for matches.  The UAE averages about 6,000 
visitors or 12,000 irises per day, which equates to approximately 10 billion comparisons 
per day [29]. So far, roughly 7.5 million exhaustive searches equating to over 7 trillion 
comparisons have been made.  The system has matched over 73,000 individuals seeking 
entry to the UAE that are on the watch list.  All matches have been confirmed via other 
records. The UAE system is the largest iris recognition system in use today [29]. 
2. Refugee Assistance and Fraud Prevention 
Iris scanning systems are being used by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Afghanistan and Congo to ensure that returning refugees are 
provided assistance, and that individuals are unable to fraudulently seek assistance more 
than once. As of May 2005, nearly 500,000 people had been enrolled in the system with 
expectations of an additional 300,000 by the end of 2005.  In this application, UNHCR 
experienced failure to enroll rate of 0.42%. The iris system helps to ensure that cash 
grants are distributed only to first time applicants [35]. 
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Figure 4.   The United Nations High Commission for Refugees administers cash grants to 
refugees returning into Afghanistan from surrounding countries after the fall of 
the Taliban, using iris patterns in lieu of any other forms of identification. More 
than 350,000 persons have so far been processed by this programme using iris 
recognition. This picture shows the Takhtabaig Voluntary Repatriation Centre, on 
the Pakistan-Afghan border. (From [29]) 
3. Airport Security 
In recent years iris scanning has been used in both airport frequent flyer programs 
and airport security.  Most of these programs are voluntary but offer volunteers the ability 
to bypass at least some elements of airport security and thereby removing or reducing a 
common hassle of air travel.  A few examples of these programs are:  
a. Privium at Schiphol Airport Amsterdam Netherlands 
In October 2001 the Schiphol Airport in the Netherlands introduced a 
frequent traveler program called Privium.  The program is open to anyone with a valid 
passport from one the European Economic Area countries and Switzerland.  The program 
allows travelers to register in advance and then again bypass the long customs and 
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immigration lines at airports when entering the country. A total of 18 airlines participate 
in the program.  The system reduces the time required to gain approval to cross the 
border to 15 seconds.  Participants must be at least 1.5 meters tall and be able to use the 
iris scanner without assistance [28]. 
In December of 2006 Indonesia introduced the Shaphire program to the 
Jakarta airport, a program similar to that of the Privium program [32].  
Heathrow Airport in London launched Project IRIS (Iris Recognition 
Immigration System) in June of 2005.  In the Pilot Review Report the UK Immigration 
Service Home Office stated that the program’s FTE rate was 1.47. The average time to 
pass through the iris scanning barrier was just under 15 seconds, with 79% of attempts 
being complete in under that time.  The fixed enrollment time was 256 seconds.  No false 
accepts were experienced during the pilot program.  The false reject rate was 3.57%; 
however, it was not possible to determine how many of those rejections were due to non-
enrollees attempting to use the system [31]. 
The UK government has expanded the program to include terminals at 
Heathrow, Manchester, Birmingham and Gatwick airports [31].  According to the official 
IRIS website there are currently 150,000 enrolled travelers and the system has 
successfully performed over 750,000 automated border entries [31]. Enrollees are 
required to have a valid passport and disabled passengers are encouraged to be 
understanding if the system will not accommodate them [31].  
The Frankfurt Airport BioP II trial had far less impressive results.  In this 
pilot program the testers experienced a false accept rate of 0.0023%. The study noted that 
false rejections seemed to decrease the more often subjects used the iris system.  
Frankfurt Airport chose to use fingerprint scanners to expedite travelers at the conclusion 




Figure 5.   The system above was used during the trial Frequent Flyers program at 
Frankfurt/Main Airport but has been discontinued with the decision to use 
fingerprints for identification instead. (From [30]) 
The United States has also launched a Registered Travelers program 
which provides iris or fingerprint  based quick passage through security at Albany, 
Cincinnati, DC Dulles, DC Reagan, Denver, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Little Rock, New 
York JFK, New York LaGuardia, Newark, Oakland, Orlando, Reno, San Francisco, San 
Jose and Westchester airports[52].  
Canada has a similar system, “CANPASS-Air” that uses iris scanning to 





In the three scenarios above the iris scans are generally taken indoors and 
do not expose the iris scanning devices or subjects being scanned to outdoor conditions 
during the iris image capture operation.  This single factor makes them quite different 
from the conditions anticipated in deployment of iris recognition technology at the gates 
of port facilities.    
4. Warzone Security 
Iris scanning has been used in Iraq to screen individuals during Iraqi army 
recruiting drives.  This application is one of the first to move iris scanning technology out 
of the controlled office environment.  The conditions under which registration takes place 
appear to be inside of tents and building that provide less than ideal conditions.  But, due 
to operational security in Iraq, we were unable to obtain performance data on the 
program.   
 
 
Figure 6.   Image from Operation Iraqi Freedom shows an Iraqi army recruit being 
screened against a database to determine if the individual has been detained 
elsewhere before and to save their identities on file. Photo provided by DOD 
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5. Other Examples 
Prison facilities in Pennsylvania and Florida started using iris recognition in 1999 
to facilitate release of prisoners or more appropriately stated to prevent the release of the 
wrong prisoners [36]. 
In November, 2002 City Hospital of Bad Reichenhall, Bavaria in Germany 
installed iris scanners to control access to newborn infants.  Here authorized individuals 
are enrolled and their eyes are scanned prior to gaining access to the infant station [33]. 
Also in 2002, National Geographic asked Daugman to use his iris recognition 
algorithms to help confirm the identity of Sharbat Gula. Sharbat had been photographed 
by Steve McCurry in 1984 at the age of 12 in a Pakistan refugee camp.  In 2002 McCurry 
was able to track Sharbat down and again photographed her [40]. What is most 
interesting about this application is that neither image was captured using an iris scanner, 
but rather the determination was made from photographs provided by McCurry.  These 





   
Figure 7.   Side by side images of Sharbat Gula an Afghan woman who was originally 
photographed as a refugee in Pakistan in 1984, and again in 2002.  Iris recognition 
algorithms confirmed it was the same individual after 18 years. © Steve 
McCurry/Magnum Photos.  (From [40]) 
In 2003 a New Jersey school district installed iris scanners to control access to 
three particular schools in that district. The system is used to establish the identities of 
both school employees and parents.  The school district uses the system to control who is 
admitted to buildings after a certain time during the school day and to confirm that 
parents are authorized to pick up children  for early dismissal [33]. 
Iris scanners are being used to help protect medical records at hospitals in 
Pennsylvania and Alabama [33] 
In 2005 the Hampshire County Sheriff in Massachusetts helped launched the 
CHILD (Children's Identification and Location Database) project.  The system provides a 
nationally available database to help identify registered individuals [37].  
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D. CURRENT RESEARCH OR RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In 2000 a study showed that the irises of identical twins (both identical and 
monozygotic) showed no stronger correlation between related individuals and unrelated 
individuals.  This established that genetic similarity was not an issue for iris recognition 
[42].  
In 2001 Daugman suggested a potential method to defeat the potential for a replay 
attack of an iris code sent from a remote source [41].  
In 2006 Daugman released results of an examination of the data collected from 
the UAE expellee program. At the time, the UAE program had collected over 630,000 
different iris scans.  The iris templates themselves were made available to the University 
of Cambridge for analysis.  The analysis of these templates was used to show that even in 
large databases of iris templates, the likelihood of a false match is still exceptionally low 
[39]. 
IRIS 2006 demonstrated a high degree of interoperability between iris equipment 
from different manufactures.  This research effort used multiple manufactures’ iris 
scanning devices for both registration and recognition. It found that an iris image 
template registered via one device was able to be matched with a temple generated by a 
different manufactures iris scanner during recognition operation [58].  This bodes well 
for the iris recognition industry; interoperability provides the end customer with the 
freedom to know whatever device they choose to purchase, it will interoperate with iris 
recognition devices already installed into their infrastructure.      
1. Daugman’s 2007 Algorithm 
In August of 2007, L-1 Identity Solutions announced the release of the Daugman 
2007 Algorithm for Highly Accurate Iris Recognition in challenging Environments.  L-1 
claims that the new algorithm will reduce false rejection rates by as much as a factor of 
10.  It also claims that this new algorithm will open the doors making iris at a distance 
and iris in motion possible.  These results were obtained from internal testing of the new 
algorithm [7]. 
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This new algorithm is “designed to overcome image quality issues encountered in 
more challenging real-world scenarios, such as iris on the move and mobile iris 
applications.  These include off axis or off nadir iris images, occlusions due to eye lashes, 
non-circular irises and other natural distortions” [7] L-1 also notes the (Iris Challenge 
Evaluation) ICE 2006 run by NIST, in which the algorithm performed at speeds nearly 50 
times faster than it nearest competitor.   
The ICE2006 study also suggests that the new “Daugman 2007 algorithm” 
performed with a lower degree of accuracy than prior results of the original Daugman iris 
recognition algorithm [38].  If the result were a true representation of the new algorithm’s 
accuracy it could have seriously impaired the industries desire to deliver devices that 
could capture iris images for recognition in less than perfect circumstances.   
Daugman responded that the ICE2006 results do not give a true representation of 
the performance of the new algorithm and suggests flaws in the testing methodology [56]. 
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III. A SURVEY OF BIOMETRIC ATTITUDES 
A. SURVEY MOTIVATION 
Since the discovery that fingerprints could be used to identify individuals, there 
have been calls to create a national registry of biometrics for purposes of solving crimes. 
None of these proposals have ever been implemented due to civil liberties concerns. 
Following September 11, 2001 there was a tremendous interest in improving levels of 
security in the Unites States. Biometrics were viewed as being part of the solution to 
achieving better means of indentifying individuals.  The “REAL ID” Act of 2005 requires 
the standardization of state identification cards including drivers’ licenses and other non-
driver identification cards. While not requiring states to collect biometrics, the states are 
not prohibited from collecting them and some states, such as California already do. But 
REAL ID has met resistance from some groups and some states. 
The United States seems to hold to a dual mindset when it comes to identification 
and the use of biometrics to help achieve it.  One the one hand, U.S. citizens seem to 
desire the Federal government to take action to increase the general level of security by 
implementing improved methods of screening and identification of those who represent a 
threat.  On the other hand, Americans have also expressed concerns that such information 
might be misused by the U.S. Government or government officials — for example, as 
Richard Nixon misused the Internal Revenue Service to harass those on his “enemies” 
list.  
However, most of what we “know”, or think we know, about public opinion is 
anecdotal and based on unscientific media reports and other observations.  A review of 
literature found surprisingly few surveys or other scholarly works that quantified the 
attitudes of Americans toward the introduction of biometrics into their daily lives. 
Technology commentator, Peter de Jager, suggests that any adoption of such 
technology must consider the beliefs and opinions of the individuals whom will be 
expected to utilize such technology.  He also suggests that no mater how rational or 
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irrational these beliefs and opinions may appear to those who are in favor of using such 
technology, or responsible for implementing the use of biometrics; they are still beliefs 
and cannot be ignored [16].  This would seem particularly true in democracies such as the 
United States where elected officials have a responsibility to respond to the public’s 
opinion.   
With this premise in mind, a survey was conducted concerning attitudes towards 
the use of biometrics. 
B. SURVEY DESCRIPTION AND METHOD 
This survey was intended to collect general attitudes concerning the use of 
biometrics. It presented participants with scenarios of uses of biometric technology by 
law enforcement agencies, other government agencies and the private sector.   
1. General Description of Survey 
The first section of the survey was made up of sets of scenarios varying from very 
limited and specific applications to much more wide-spread applications of biometrics.  
Much of this sections questions were either based on or taken directly from a 2001/2002 
survey conducted by Opinion Corporation [15].  This set of questions provided a set of 
scenarios that would escalate in perceived levels of infringement on ones “right to 
privacy” to determination if generalizations could be made about where Americans felt 
giving ground in privacy was worth the additional security they felt it would bring them.  
They were also intended to provide a means of comparing our results with those from the 
surveys conducted in 2001 and 2002 which had 1046 and 1017 respondents respectively.   
The second section discussed specific scenarios involving iris recognition.  The 
goal was to assess the respondent’s views and knowledge and to try and understand how 
the choices between privacy and security would be made. 
A section followed to inquire about participants concerns with iris scanning and 
their level of confidence in the ability of iris scanning to differentiate between 
individuals, and any health concerns about the use of iris scanning. 
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The Opinion Corporation survey had included a section of questions about 
participants’ experience with both violent crime and identity theft.  These questions were 
added in hopes of seeing a correlation between these experiences and attitudes, in 
particular, ones willingness to give ground in the area of privacy when compared to those 
who had not been victims of such crimes. 
There was an open-ended request for comments concerning moral or religious 
objections, or other concerns with the use of biometrics.  Also collected was general 
demographic data about participants.  This was used to look at correlations between 
opinions and demographic groups and to identify possible demographic bias in the group 
of participants. 
The survey is attached as Appendix A. 
2. Survey Method 
The Biometric Attitudes survey was prepared and distributed via an internet 
survey website (SurveyMonkey.com).  The web based delivery was chosen as it would 
provide a medium for obtaining a geographically diverse sampling.  The survey medium 
chosen likely introduces a sampling bias.  It limits participants to those with internet 
access and enough computer savvy to navigate to and through the SurveyMonkey web 
site.   
The survey itself was anonymous and no personally identifiable information was 
collected from participants. However, demographic data was collected. 
3. Method of Solicitation 
Survey participants were solicited via three methods: 
• Adds placed on Craigslist 
• Bulletins posted on Social Networking Sites which included Ringo.com, 
MySpace.com and Facebook.com 
• E-mail solicitation of co-workers, family, friends and acquaintances. 
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We sought approval from the NPS Internal Review Board (IRB) to give away a 
single Apple iPod Nano as an incentive to encourage participation of individuals through 
postings to Craigslist.com.  This request was denied and we were limited to soliciting 
respondents without any incentive.  This may have limited survey participation to 
individuals who were personally connected to the author in some way and resulted in 
further biasing of the survey sample. 
C. SURVEY COMPLETION RATE 
The survey solicitation resulted in 99 individual survey starts, with 74 respondents 
completing the survey. This 76% completion rate suggests that some individuals lost 
interest in the survey or were interrupted while taking the survey.  The average time to 
complete the survey was approximately fourteen minutes. 
D. WHO TOOK THE SURVEY 
The solicitation methods used for recruitment of respondents made it difficult to 
identify individual groups among the survey respondents.  The solicitation was sent to 
three distinct groups of potential respondents.  The first group were individuals who had 
a personal connection to the author, the second group were government employees, 
contractors and military personnel at Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography 
Command (FNMOC) and the third being real estate agents and employees at a Monterey, 
California area real estate firm.  Due to the solicitation being sent out to all groups at 
roughly the same time (within the same day), the use of a single survey URL and the 
expressed effort to ensure the anonymity of the respondents, it was not possible to 
distinguish between these groups.  
The survey did collect some demographic information from the respondents that 
provided some insight into potential differences in opinions.  These overall results will be 
presented side by side with the results specific to these groups, with answers that were 
statistically different being highlighted. 
In a future application of this survey it is suggested that a better method of 
respondent recruitment be utilized, that will ensure respondents from different 
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advertisements for participation or different social groups, to ensure they can easily be 
identified.  Two suggestions for this would be to use a different URL to collect responses 
for each group surveyed or to ensure that the groups are surveyed at different times such 
that their responses are easily identifiable via the dated respondents answered the survey. 
1. Political Orientation 
Because attitudes of privacy vs. security are often phrased in terms of 













18 19 18 (26%) 11 4 
37 (53%)  15 (21%) 
70 
Table 2.   Political orientation of respondents. 
2. Victims of Identity Theft 
Because biometrics have been proposed as a tool for fighting identity 
theft, we also collected information concerning respondent’s personal experience with 
identity theft.  Having been a victim of identity theft turned out to be indicative in a 
couple of questions of the survey:  







Yes 19.7% 15 
No 71.1% 54 
Don't Know 9.2% 7 
Table 3.   Victims of Identity Theft. 
3. Victims of Violent Crime 
It was anticipated that the victims of violent crime would be more likely to 
support the use of biometrics.  A small number of respondents (7%) had experienced 
violent crime: all of which were women. 
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Question: Have you ever been the victim of a 
violent crime? 
Answer Options Response Percent
Response 
Count 
Yes 6.6% 5 
No 90.8% 69 
Don't Know 2.6% 2 
  answered question 76
Table 4.   Victims of violent crime. 
This is an area that would have benefited from a much larger survey 
response.  Those who experienced violent crime appeared to be more in favor of the use 
of biometrics in many scenarios where the overall respondent opinion was less 
supportive. Due to the small number of respondents identifying themselves as victims, it 
was difficult to draw statistically sound conclusions.  
In future work it is also suggested that more information should be 
collected from victims of violent crime.  It would be helpful to further classify the type of 
violent crime they experienced, specifically was the crime related to theft, mugging, car 
jacking – crimes where money was the apparent motivation for the violent crime, as 
opposed to those who experienced a violent crime where money was not the apparent 
motivation.  This information might further explain the opinions of victims of monetarily 
motivated violent crimes with regard to the acceptability of certain applications of 
biometrics. 
4. Gender 
Gender was suspected to play a role in some of the questions that asked 
about the use of biometrics to protect children. 
Questions: What is your gender? 
Answer Options Response Percent
Response 
Count 
Male 54.7% 41 
Female 45.3% 34 
  answered question 75
Table 5.   Gender of respondents. 
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5. Education Level 
Education level was one of several demographic indicators collected by 
the survey instrument.  It ended up helping us identify a potential bias in our survey 
respondents. According to a March 2007 press release from the U.S. Census Bureau, 28% 
of Americans had obtained a bachelors degree [43].  This was out of agreement with the 
demographics collected from survey participants. Of the respondents who answered the 








Technical or Trade 
School Graduate 




Graduate School Masters Degree PH. D. Response Count 
27 18 14 2 74 














25-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65 and over
 
Table 7.   Graph of respondent ages. 
Survey respondents ranged in age from 25 to 78, with an average age of 43.   
E. SURVEY LIMITATIONS 
This survey should be considered a pilot study.  The largest limitation to the value 
of the results of this survey is the inability to say much about the respondents and the 
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relatively low number of individuals who responded to the solicitation for participation.  
While the responses were not collected randomly, they provided a pool that was 
sufficient to evaluate the survey itself and provided general insight to public opinion. 
This lack of a random survey sampling leads to a potential for future work to 
repeat the survey, after improvement in some of the questions for clarity and more 
appropriate options for answers.   
F. SEGMENTATION OF RESPONDENTS 
We collected demographic data from the survey respondents with the hope of 
being able to find commonalities between individual respondents and to help understand 
what some predicative factors might be.  We focused on political orientation, gender, and 
whether or not the respondent had been the victim of identity theft.  Finally we separated 
out the respondents who had been the victim of a violent crime.  While there were not 
enough respondents in this final group (only 5 respondents) to produce any statistically 
significant analysis, their tendencies to find certain scenarios acceptable was interesting. 
G. SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Potential Uses of Biometrics by Law Enforcement 
We began by asking questions surrounding public safety and the use of 
biometrics, mostly limited to either identifying criminals or individuals suspected of a 
crime with a high degree of certainly.   
The following questions were asked with this introduction:  
Here are some ways that LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES are using 
or might use a biometric ID system to identify people. Considering the 
potential benefits to society, but also keeping in mind the potential threats 
to privacy, how acceptable would each of these uses be? In your view, 
would the following scenarios be very acceptable, somewhat acceptable, 
not very acceptable, or not acceptable at all? 
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Question 1§:  Detectives could take a fingerprint found at a crime scene, turn it into a 
biometric reading, and use this to search state and federal databases of convicted 
offenders.  (§ 94% acceptable) 
§ The 94% acceptable was the result of the 2001 survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation on a 
population 1046. [15] 
Results:  100% of respondent found this to be an acceptable use for biometrics. 
Table 8.   Responses to question 1. 
The use of fingerprints to identify suspects at crime scenes is commonplace today 
and this practice is also presented as normal in many popular television shows. This may 
contribute to respondents in general being comfortable with this use of fingerprints.  In 
this scenario, an individual would have left a fingerprint at a crime scene in order for 
their fingerprint to be compared, creating ample reason for them to be subjected to some 
level of scrutiny. 
 
Question 2§:  Police in patrol cars who stopped a driver for highway violations could take 
a computer scan of a driver’s finger, and then use a computer terminal in the patrol car to 
check this against a database of fugitives involved in serious crimes. (§ 85% acceptable) 
Results: Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
Note:  Under the category of females w/o VCV means females excluding those who had 
been Violent Crime Victims.  Responses from women who had been violent crime 
victims are including the “Female- all” column. 
All (87) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female Victims of (5) 
  Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
80% 76% 87% 80% 83% 78% 85% 86% 80% 
Table 9.   Responses to question 2. 
Here we see a fairly even level of agreement with this potential use of biometrics 
in the area of law enforcement.   One suggestion here is that people find that if an 
individual has broken a law (the assumption being that if you have been pulled over by a 
law enforcement officer, you have broken a traffic law) then using biometrics to confirm 
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your identity is appropriate.  It is a common practice today for law enforcement to check 
for outstanding warrants when they pull an individual over for a routine traffic violation.  
Again, here the individual would have been either convicted of a crime or highly likely to 
have committed the crime. 
 
Question 3§: Law enforcement agencies could use finger or hand scan biometrics to 
allow only authorized officials to enter law enforcement intelligence files. (§ 93% 
acceptable) 
Results:   Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
 
All (87) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female Victims of (5) 
  Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
97% 97% 100% 93% 98% 98% 94% 93% 100% 
Table 10.   Responses to question 3. 
Here it appears the respondents felt steps should be taken to protect information 
held in “intelligence files” and it is appropriate to use biometrics to confirm the identity 
of individuals seeking access to them.  In this scenario, an individual is seeking access to 
information that is restricted and has the potential to cause public harm if publically 
released.  These responses match very closely to question nine and twelve asked later 
concerning the protection of “classified” military information.   
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Question 4§: Police could use facial recognition technology to scan the features of people 
attending major sports events or public ceremonies, looking for fugitives for serious 
crimes whose facial formulas they had in their system. (§ 74% acceptable) 
 Results:   Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows:  
* The differences of opinion between men and women here met a 95% confidence level. 
(p < 0.05)  with women finding the use of facial recognition in this scenario being more 
acceptable than men.   
All (87) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female Victims of (5) 
  Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
64% 68% 80% 73% 67% 61%* 76%* 79%* 60% 
Table 11.   Responses to question 4. 
In this question we asked about the use of facial recognition at sporting events or 
other public events. This was the least acceptable potential use of biometrics.  Here we 
cross a line where the individual being scanned has done nothing to draw police scrutiny 
or attention.  One possible explanation for the much lower level of support for this 
application of biometric use might be that individuals believe that by simply attending a 
public event, they have not broken any laws themselves, and therefore should not be 
subjected to any form of screening or monitoring.  A further issue may be the potential 
for facial recognition to be done without their knowledge and they may feel this is an 
invasion of their privacy.   
One could argue that individuals do not have to attend the public event if they 
don’t want to be “scanned.”  After all, no one is forcing them to attend.  But when asked 
about a sporting event, some individuals may feel that sporting events are as American as 
apple pie, after all baseball is the proverbial “America’s pastime.”  Conducting 
“monitoring” at such an event might be seen as an overstepping of the authority of police. 
For future work, it might be prudent to ask this question twice, with the second 
question tying the use of facial recognition in this scenario to look for “potential 
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terrorists” rather than “fugitives of serious crimes.”  It is possible that under the auspice 
of protecting the public from a terrorist attack, such scans might be viewed as more 
acceptable. 
The difference of opinion expressed between men and women here might be 
explained again by the use of “sporting event” in this question.  It might be that men tend 
to place a higher value on their ability to attend a sporting event freely and without any 
government monitoring of movement, while women may in general feel more vulnerable 
to being a victim of crime in a public setting. 
It is also interesting to note that this was not a political left vs. right question as 
the differences in responses from the conservatives and liberals are not statically 
significant. 
It is also interesting that this question generated the largest difference between our 
results and the result from the 2001 and 2002 surveys.  In those surveys, 74% of the 
respondents felt that this was an acceptable use of biometrics.  This might be an 
indication of a shift in public opinion as the memory of the September 11, 2001 attacks 
have become less fresh on the minds of many Americans than they were in 2001 and 
2002; this question was originally asked in late September 2001 by the Opinions 
Research Corporation[15].  
 
Question 5§: Law enforcement agencies could create a biometric database of all persons 
convicted of a serious crime, for use in later criminal investigations. (§ 91% acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
 
All (87) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female Victims of (5) 
  Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
98% 97% 100% 100% 96% 98% 97% 97% 100% 
Table 12.   Responses to question 5. 
Here again we may see the acceptance of the respondents to the practice of law 
enforcement currently building such fingerprint databanks.  While today these databanks 
do not hold everyone’s fingerprints, it would seem that individuals are fairly comfortable 
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with such and idea. In 2001 this question resulted in 68% of respondents answering that 
this would be a “very acceptable” use of biometrics.  Our survey respondents answered it 
would be “very acceptable” 80% of the time. (When compared to the 2001 survey p < 
.05)  This might indicate another shift in public opinion concerning the acceptability of 
such practices. 
2. Potential Uses of Biometrics by Other Government Agencies 
The following questions were asked with this introduction:  
Now, here are some ways that OTHER TYPES OF GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES might take a biometric reading of individuals and compare it 
to a stored database of identity formulas. Again, please consider both the 
potential benefits to society AND also the potential threats to privacy, and 
then tell me how acceptable each of these uses would be, in your view -- 
very acceptable, somewhat acceptable, not very acceptable, or not 
acceptable at all?  
 
Question 6 §:  School security guards could screen people entering a school, and 
compare the scans against a biometric database of convicted child molesters.  (§ 88% 
acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001 (there were 0 responses of “not acceptable”) 
All (84) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female Victims of (5) 
  Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
83% 84% 80% 87% 83% 73%** 97%** 97%** 100%*** 
Table 13.   Responses to question 6. 
This question saw statistically significant differences in the answer of self-
identified men and women.  While only 73% of men found this to be an acceptable use of 
biometrics, women responded with over 97% finding this to be an acceptable use of 
biometrics.  The most stereotypically obvious interpretation of this would point to the 
maternal instinct in women.  While this may or may not be the true cause, it is apparent 
that in the group of respondents to this survey, gender appeared to play a strong indicator. 
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Question 7 §:  To prevent people from obtaining double welfare benefits, officials could 
screen people seeking welfare checks against a biometric database of those eligible for 
the benefit. (§ 85% acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (84) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
89% 89% 87% 93% 91% 88%* 97%* 97%* 100% 
Table 14.   Responses to question 7. 
Here again we see a gender difference in responses.  It might be that women have 
a stronger sense of “fairness.”  One other possible explanation could be the placement of 
this question, as the prior question also elicited a significantly stronger response from 
women. It is possible that that strong response “bled over”, if-you-will to this question 
and that those who responded strongly to the previous question concerning children 
continued to respond with great level of support for this application as well.  
This result here is somewhat surprising as intuitively it would seem that those 
who had been victims of identity theft would have been more likely to voice strong 
support for this application.  However, victims of identity theft answer only slight more 
in favor of this application than the general respondent pool, but not in a way that was 
statistically significant. 
In future applications of this survey it might be beneficial to change the order of 




Question 8 §:  Election officials could check a biometric database of convicted criminals 
and others who are not eligible to vote, and bar such persons from voting.  (§ 72% 
acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (84) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
80%* 78% 80% 93%** 76%** 78% 88% 86% 100% 
Table 15.   Responses to question 8. 
Identity theft victims seem to be much more supportive of the application of 
biometrics to ensure voters are who they say they are.  It would seem that having 
experienced the trials that go along with identity theft and the emotion of having someone 
else pretending to be you might elicit stronger support of methods to prevent such 
occurrences in voting applications.  This was also a significant shift from the 2001 survey 
results [15] with an increase in acceptance from 2001.  This shift might be the result of 
the political focus on the 2008 Presidential race that was present at the time this survey 
was administered.  In 2001 there was no Presidential race looming in the near future and 
certainly not the same amount of media attention was being paid to political races. 
It is also worth noting that this was not a right vs. left issue with the two groups’ 
responses being nearly equal.  This was somewhat counter intuitive as it is often the case 
that political liberals seem to oppose limits being placed on voters based on strong 
identity verification or other such limits.  This usually seems to be caused by the 
anticipation that less affluent voters tend toward being liberal voters and that restrictions 
of this sort are more likely to affect less affluent voters. 
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Question 9 §:  Managers of high-security government facilities, such as laboratories or 
military bases, could screen people seeking entry against a biometric database of persons 
authorized to enter. (§ 95% acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (84) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
96% 97% 93% 93% 98% 95% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 16.   Responses to question 9. 
Respondents found using biometrics to protect government research to be 
acceptable.  Here we can theorize that respondents believe that there is not an invasion of 
privacy involved when an individual seeks access to a government facility such as the 
one described in the question.  This type of facility inherently needs some form of 
personal accountability of the individuals who seek access, so the addition of biometrics 
to achieve this is not opposed. 
Question 10 §:  Immigration officials could sign up persons wanting to speed up entry at 
passport-control stations, and process travelers more quickly in this way. (§ 85% 
acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (84) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime
89% 86% 93% 93% 87% 90% 88% 90% 80% 
Table 17.   Responses to question 10. 
There is fairly good support for this application of biometrics.  One possible 
explanation is that respondents can envision this application providing some benefit to 
them.  Anyone who has waited to pass through a port-of-entry knows that getting through 




be viewed positively.  The second related explanation is there is currently a high level of 
concern over border security and respondents may see biometrics as having the potential 
to help improve border security. 
Question 11 §:  Government agencies issuing required occupational licenses – such as for 
teachers, private guards, or nursing home workers – could check applicant’s biometric 
against a database of criminal offenders not eligible to be licensed. (§ 90% acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (80) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
89% 86% 87% 87% 89% 85% 91% 90% 100% 
Table 18.   Responses to question 11. 
Here again, respondents found this to be an acceptable use of biometrics.  Privacy 
does not seem to be a large concern when an individual is given a choice about 
submitting to a biometric check.  When applying for a government issued license there is 
already some degree of privacy that has been given up through the application process 
itself.  In addition, the very reason for requiring licenses is to protect the public from 
individuals either unqualified or untrustworthy to conduct certain kinds of business.   
Thus respondents may see this application as serving the public good, as well as serving 
their own interests as well. 
 
Question 12:  Government agencies could use biometrics to screen individuals who seek 
access to "secure" rooms that are designed to all the processing of sensitive or classified 
information, to ensure they have been cleared to have such access 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001 
All (80) Politically (52) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
99% 97% 100% 93% 100% 98% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 19.   Responses to question 12. 
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As noted in question three, there seems to be great support for the use of 
biometrics when protecting “government secrets.”  This is likely due to the concern over 
the potential harm that the leakage of classified information might bring about if that 
information were to fall into the wrong hands.  Here the value of protecting the asset in 
question would seem to outweigh any privacy issue.  It is also possible that many of the 
respondents view this as an application that is not likely to ever directly affect them and 
therefore there is little concern about the privacy of those who would be subjected to such 
an application.  The contrary also is likely to hold.  Those that are likely to be subjected 
to such devices in their jobs would tend to see this not as an invasion of privacy, but 
possibly even as an increase in accountability of classified information. 
3. Potential Uses of Biometrics in the Private Sector 
Here are some ways that PRIVATE-SECTOR organizations might take a 
biometric reading of individuals and compare it to a stored database of 
identity templates. Once more please consider both the potential benefits 
to society AND the potential threats to privacy, and tell me how 
acceptable each of these uses would be. In your view, would they be very 
acceptable, somewhat acceptable, not very acceptable, or not acceptable at 
all? 
Question 13 §:  Automated teller machines (ATM’s) operated by banks could require a 
biometric for withdrawing funds in addition to your ATM card and PIN. (§ 78% 
acceptable) 
Question 14:   Automated teller machines (ATM’s) operated by banks could require a 
biometric for withdrawing funds without an ATM card.  
Question 19 §:   Credit card firms could offer card members a biometric to verify their 
identity for large transactions, and increase the security of credit card transactions. (§ 
86% acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
Q# All (78) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
  Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
13 68% 59% 71% 73% 67% 59% 76% 72% 100% 
14 60% 57% 57% 67% 61% 54% 68% 66% 80% 
19 79% 76%* 93%* 87%* 78%* 80% 76% 72% 100% 
Table 20.   Responses to questions 13, 14 and 19. 
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We will examine question 13, 14 and 19 together as there are some interesting 
observations when taken together.  While the overall level of support for the application 
of biometrics for ATM or credit card transactions is not as strong as we have seen for 
many other government and law enforcement applications, still over 68% of respondents 
saw protecting their financial assets as an acceptable application of biometric technology.    
Respondents may be weighting the perceived increase in protection of their own money 
they would receive, with the potential loss of convenience.  It may be that respondents 
believed that they were likely to experience delays or even the potential for being rejected 
access to their own money via a false rejection by the biometric device used for verifying 
their identity.   
It is also possible that respondents don’t use their ATM and credit cards in the 
manner they are intended to be used by the banks that issue them.  With a card that 
requires only a PIN number, that card can be “lent” to a trusted family member, who 
when also provided the PIN, can then access the account on your behalf.  If you add the 
requirement of a biometric verification this changes the arrangement they have with the 
financial institution.  A card with PIN number requires only the token and a secret to be 
utilized; it does not require the owner to be present!  By adding a biometric verification to 
the mix, that changes, and now the owner no longer has the freedom to allow a trusted 
party to act on their behalf.  This is a loss of convenience, even if it does improve 
security.  
Another potential loss of convenience, which might have been considered by the 
respondents, is where you are able to use such a card.  As this would be the introduction 
of a new technology to a system that works “adequately” well today, how quick the new 
readers might be adopted to their favorite shops.  If the shops they frequent don’t have a 
reader capable of checking the biometric, they might be denied the ability to shop there. 
Victims of identity theft were not significantly more likely to be accepting of this 
application at ATM’s.  This might be because identity theft does not happen at ATM’s.  
However, violent crime does happen at ATM’s, but it is doubtful that the use of 
biometrics is likely to reduce that possibility of violent crime, so the lack of difference 
between these groups may make sense. 
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However when you up the stakes and ask if they find the use of a biometric check 
when the transaction is “large” the response of finding it acceptable goes up, from 68% to 
79% (p < .05).  Identity theft victims found this to be more acceptable than their non-
identity theft counterparts.  This suggests that at some point the risk involved to ones own 
finances outweigh the potential loss of convenience. An alternative explanation is that a 
biometric verification is seen as overkill with regular “everyday” smaller transactions, but 
reasonable when the dollar amount is large “enough.”  It is also more likely that a retailer 
that sells items that have “large” price tags would be more likely to install the biometric 
readers sooner than small item or low dollar shops would be.    
Interestingly the political liberals also seemed to find this more acceptable than 
their conservative counterparts.  This result is somewhat counter-intuitive as conservative 
respondents were almost over three times more likely to have been the victims of identity 
theft.  A free-form question might be a good addition to any future survey; to ask 
respondents to explain their response to this and other questions.  
Question 15 §:  Computer system managers could use a biometric to admit persons 
authorized to access sensitive files, such as medical or financial information. (§ 77% 
acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (76) Politically (51) ID Theft (67) Male (39) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
84% 86% 79% 87% 85% 85% 82% 79% 100% 
Table 21.   Responses to question 15. 
This time we see that when it comes to protecting information that is of some 
level of confidentiality to the individual (financial or medical records) there is a high 





Question 16 §:  Gambling casinos could use facial scanning technology to screen out 
professional card counters or others banned from gambling in the casinos. (§ 56% 
acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (78) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
56% 41%** 79%** 60% 56% 46%* 68%* 72%* 40% 
Table 22.   Responses to question 16. 
Question 16 is one of the more interesting questions of the survey, and it 
produced probably the most noticeable divide along political orientation lines.  It also 
resulted in one of the lowest overall votes of acceptability of all the potential uses we 
suggested.  Overall, just 56% of respondents found this to be an acceptable application of 
biometrics, with conservatives over twice as likely to say they found this to be an 
unacceptable scenario.  Men were also much more likely to find this less acceptable.  
Women self reported themselves to be slightly more conservative than the men did.  
One potential explanation for the lower level of support here could be that casinos 
are not viewed as a positive societal influence.  This might in particular explain the very 
low conservative acceptance of this application.  An alternative theory would be that 
many individuals feel that casinos are just “legalized thieves” themselves and as such 
don’t “deserve” to be afforded the level of protection biometrics might provide.  It could 
also be that if facial recognition were used, this could potentially create a record of what 
“happens-in-Vegas” with the potential for it no longer “stay-in-Vegas.” 
Another alternative could be that facial recognition is what the respondents picked 
up on.  This could have been viewed as an intrusive biometric that is acquired by the 





Question 17 §:  Employers could check the biometric of job applicants against a 
government database of convicted felons. (§ 76% acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (78) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
82% 78%* 93%* 80% 81% 76%* 88%* 86%* 100% 
Table 23.   Responses to question 17. 
Overall we see a high degree of acceptance of the use of biometrics to check job 
applicants against a database of felons.  It is likely that this is seen as an action that would 
protect the public from criminals who might otherwise present a threat to unaware 
individuals.  Many jobs require applicants to disclose any criminal history, as a matter of 
law.  The use of biometrics could help to ensure that a deceptive job applicant couldn’t 
simply assume someone else’s identity in order to avoid admitting to a potentially 
disqualifying past. 
Here we see difference in the responses between political conservatives vs. 
liberals; where conservatives were less likely to support this application. It is possible 
that conservatives felt individuals should be hired on the basis of their qualifications and 
past job performance rather than any criminal past.   
Women were also more likely to see this as an acceptable application than men.  
This might be explained by women viewing themselves as more vulnerable to a violent 
crime and as such, found it more important to reduce the risk of working with potentially 







Question 18 §:  Stores selling guns could be required to check each person seeking to 
buy gun against a federal-government database of convicted felons and others not 
allowed by law to purchase firearms. (§ 91% acceptable) 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (78) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
92% 89%** 100%** 100% 91% 88%* 97%* 97%* 100% 
Table 24.   Responses to question 18. 
When it comes to gun safety there is considerable support for the application of 
biometrics to ensure only acceptable individuals are able to purchase firearms.  In many 
ways this level of support is not a surprise as it may be seen as an additional step on the 
part of those who are politically liberal to limit gun sales.  To political conservatives it 
might be viewed as a method to better enforce the current laws surrounding the purchase 
of firearms, thus possibly reducing the likelihood of new gun control laws.   Currently to 
purchase any firearm in any of the 50 states, an individual must fill out ATF form 4473 
which asks the prospective gun purchaser if he or she has ever: a) been convicted of a 
felony that could have carried a sentence of a year or longer, b) been subject to a 
restraining order, been dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Military, c) been convicted 
of domestic violence or having d) been found to satisfy other relevant conditions [46]. An 
answer in the affirmative to any of those questions prevents the firearms dealer from 
legally selling a firearm to that individual.  However, this form is simply filled out and 
signed by the customer, and unless the State in which the firearms sale is taking place 
requires a background check on the sale of all firearms, the dealer can only take the 
customer at their word. (The “Brady Bill” of 1993 mandates a background check prior to 
the sale of all handguns only, and not prior to the sale of rifles or other firearms.) 
The use of biometrics to confirm an individual’s identity and to search registries 
that would identify an individual as meeting one of the denial criteria would provide the 
firearms dealer with an additional method to ensure his customer is indeed eligible to 
purchase a firearm.  This would provide a means to enforce the current gun laws more 
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effectively without requiring more restrictive gun laws to be enacted.  Thus gun safety 
might be increased simply by a more robust application of existing laws. 
Conservative respondents were a bit more wary of such an application of 
biometrics, possible because they might view it as further erosion of their rights under the 
Second Amendment.  Men were also more reluctant to support this application.  While 
there are not direct statistics on the percentage of men vs. women who purchase firearms 
as not all gun sales are reported to government, it is commonly believed that men are 
more likely to be gun enthusiasts, so it might be natural for men to be more reluctant to 
see additional barriers or steps to go through to purchase a firearm. 
 
Question 19:  Employers could use biometric scanners to note when employees enter or 
exit their facilities.  For hourly employees, this system would function as a "time-clock." 
It would also improve employee safety: in the event of a fire or other disaster, the system 
could be used to immediately produce a list of all employees in a building 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (78) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
63% 57% 71% 73% 56% 61% 62% 62% 60% 
Table 25.   Responses to question 19. 
In question 19 we present another scenario where individuals have committed no 
crime or in any way violated any restrictions placed upon them.  This scenario received a 
lower level of support (63%), possibly because it suggests a sort of “big-brother” action 
by an individual’s employer.  However, it would also seem that respondents understood 
that the employer does indeed have a right to the comings and goings of its employees as 
employees trade their time for a paycheck. 
The scenario also directly suggests that this could improve the safety of all 
employees and may even imply a certain convenience to respondents with occupations 
that may require them to “clock-in” each time they begin a shift for their employer and 
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the idea of being automatically “clocked in” when entering their employers facility rather 
than after they reach the time clock could be seen as increasing the time they would be 
paid for. 
However, the potential in this sort of scenario for an “automatic biometric time-
clock” is the very issue that ILWU members object to so strongly about the TWIC 
program [61].  In their case, the union representative states that the additional security 
provided by the TWIC program and any biometric verification of a person’s identity does 
not out-weigh their perception of the program invading their current level of freedom to 
be at the job site only during the portions of the day when there is work for them to do. 
 
Question 20:  Think of a store where you shop on a regular basis. The store has purchased 
an iris scanner that can scan you as you walk through the front door without the need for 
you to stop or face in a certain direction. Each time you enter that store your iris will be 
scanned so that the store can make note of your patronage. The store will use this 
information to alert employees of your presence (and pull up your recent purchases) so 
that they can provide you with personalized assistance. If you wish, you will be able to 
have the system automatically send coupons to your mobile phone as you enter as well. 
Results:  Respondents found this to be acceptable as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001  
All (78) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim   all(34) w/o VCV(29) Violent Crime 
21% 16% 36% 20% 20% 15% 29% 28% 40% 
Table 26.   Responses to question 20. 
This scenario was probably the most invasive suggested use of biometrics and not 
surprisingly received the lowest level of acceptability from survey respondents.  This low 
level of acceptability (over 76% of respondents found this to be somewhat or very 
unacceptable) strongly suggest that individuals are not comfortable with any method of 
identification or individualized monitoring in situations that today do not require it.  
Furthermore, there is no suggestion of this application improving the safety of patrons 
and even the added benefit of having individually select coupons sent to the patron does 
not seem to outweigh the perceived invasion of privacy. 
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Interestingly, this may be an issue of when the store is able to identify the patron.  
Today, stores are able to track the purchases of their customers whenever a customer 
pays using a credit card or debit card.  Many stores offer “reward programs” that 
incentivize their customer to allow the store to track their purchases even when paying 
with cash.  So the real issue may be that in this scenario, patrons are made uncomfortably 
aware of the insight the store may have into their habits. 
4. Possible Scenarios for Iris Recognition 
In the next section, we shift our focus to iris scanning in particular and away from 
biometrics in general.   
Questions 21-26: When asked if they agreed with the following statements. Respondents 
answered as follows: 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001 (Statistical significance when compared to question 21 – 
to obtain a credit card.) 
All Politically  ID Theft Male Female Victims of  
  Conservative Liberal Victim 
Non-
Victim   all w/o VCV Violent Crime
I would be comfortable 
having my iris scanned to 
obtain a credit card. 33% 27% 36% 47% 28% 24% 44% 41% 60% 
I would be comfortable
having my iris scanned to 
obtain a passport. 63%** 62% 57% 67% 61% 61% 68% 66% 80% 
I would be comfortable
having my iris scanned to 
obtain a driver’s license. 47%* 41% 57% 40% 46% 46% 50% 45% 80% 
I would be comfortable
having my iris scanned to 
obtain a social security
number. 59%** 46% 64% 60% 54% 54% 68% 66% 80% 
I would be comfortable if
hospitals gave newborns
iris scans. 30% 22% 36% 33% 28% 20%* 44%* 41% 60% 
If the U.S. Government
were to collect iris scan of
everyone in the United
States, I believe that the iris
scan would only be used for
official purposes such as
confirming a person’s
identity at an airport. 22%* 19% 21% 33% 20% 15% 32% 31% 40% 
Table 27.   Responses to questions 21 – 26, potential uses of iris recognition.  
Percentages indicate those that agreed with the statement. The box indicates a 
statistically-significant difference between men and women.  
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Respondents indicated that they were more comfortable than not in two of the 
proposed scenarios: obtaining a passport and obtaining a Social Security Number, 63% 
and (59%).  Respondents were more comfortable with providing an iris scan when it 
came to security or in dealings with the Federal Government.  Only one-third of 
respondents indicated they would be comfortable with providing an iris scan to obtain a 
credit card and slightly less than half of the respondents were comfortable with providing 
an iris scan to obtain a drivers license.   
Women were twice as likely as men to be comfortable with allowing hospitals to 
collect iris scan of newborns; however, this was still less than half of all women.   Again 
this is likely due to the maternal instinct. 
The level of mistrust of the government was somewhat inconsistent with overall 
results in this group of questions.  The only two scenarios that more than half of the 
respondents found acceptable were both scenarios that required dealing with the 
government, while less than one in four individuals stated they trust the government not 
to misuse that information.  There are two possible explanations that stood out: One is 
that these same individuals trust the private enterprises they would be dealing with in the 
other two scenarios even less than they trust the government.  However, the more likely 
explanation for this apparent disconnect is that the governmental interactions suggested 
are the basis for establishing an individual identity in almost every facet of live in 
America. 
5. Mistrust of Government 
The best explanation of the low levels of support for such scenarios might be 
indicated by the last question in this section.  Less than one-quarter of the respondents 
believed that the U.S. Government could be trusted to use iris scans for “official 
purposes.”  This suggests that individuals feel that any such collection of biometrics and 
iris scans in particular would inevitably be used for purposes that might be either 
considered “unofficial” or go beyond the uses the U.S. Government was authorized to use 
them for.  The survey allowed respondents to give a free response to this question — 
some of the responses are illustrative.: 
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• “No, however, my approval of biometrics corresponds exactly to the level 
of trust for my government.   As such, if I were Chinese or Russian, my 
answers would be very much opposed.” 
• “No. But I do oppose the collection and storing of this type of information 
from innocent people, in light of what the government would do with it 
once it has been collected.” 
• “Not really--I tend to view it as inevitable.  Human nature being what it 
is/prophecies having been made 1000's of years ago, I know they will 
eventually be greatly misused.” 
• “I believe that we all have right to privacy and that biometrics will 
eventually be used to track our individual activities well beyond what we 
comfortable today.  Eventually, I think [biometrics] will facilitate the 
acceptance of the Biblical "Mark of the Beast."  But that is more about 
where biometric use could and probably will lead rather than the use of 
biometrics themselves.” 
These responses indicate that some respondents simply feel it is an unavoidable 
and foregone conclusion that if given the ability to identify its citizens without their 
knowledge (both iris and facial recognition present this potential), that the U.S. 
government will eventually misuse this ability.  Two of the above responses also indicate 




6. Confidence in Iris Recognition Technology 
Questions 27-29: When asked their opinions of the effectiveness and trustworthiness of iris 
recognition respondents agreed with the following statements as indicated. 
* p < .05;  **p < .01; ***p < .001 
All(76) Politically (51)  ID Theft (69) 
Male 
(41) Female (34) Victims of (5)
 
  Conservative Liberal Victim 
Non-
Victim   all w/o VCV Violent Crime
I think that iris scans are
unique for each individual. 
67% 65% 50% 73% 65% 71% 62% 55% 100% 
I think that the patterns on an
iris can be duplicated well
enough to fool a scanner. 20% 24%* 7%* 0% 24% 22% 18% 17% 20% 
I think that it will become so
easy to duplicate an iris that,
if iris scanners were widely
used, iris prints would be 
stolen on a regular basis. 20% 30%* 7%* 27% 31% 22% 18% 21% 0% 
Table 28.   Respondent opinions concerning the trustworthiness of iris recognition. 
Over half of the respondents answering (40 out of 76) did not know if irises could 
be duplicated; this indicates unfamiliarity with the technology.  No victim of identity 
theft believed that it was not possible to duplicate an iris well enough to at least fool an 
iris scanner, and political conservatives were more trusting of the technology than were 
liberals. 
Again, one of the responses to having any moral or religious objections sums up 
one of the potential problems if biometrics sources are replicable; 
• My concern is the storage and theft of biometric data.  Biometric data theft 
could make clearing ID theft harder...If your fingerprint/iris scan was used 
fraudulently...you cannot just get a new one.     I feel databases of known 
criminals used to identify criminals in specific situations where it is illegal 
to participate is fine but random public scanning would not be OK. 
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7. Fear of Injury for Iris Scanners 
Questions 30-31: When asked if they had any concerns of physical injury  from iris scanners, 
respondents said they did have some concern of injury as follows: 
Question 30: Do you have any concerns of physical injury with the use of iris scanners 
 
 
All(76) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim  all w/o VCV Violent Crime 
35% 39% 50% 20% 40% 33% 36% 34% 35% 
After providing the following explanation: An iris scanner works by taking a picture of your 
iris and then compares that image to a known sample of your iris. In most cases, the photo 
taken poses no more risk that a regular picture taken by any camera.  The respondent were 
then asked: 
Question 31: Knowing this, do you now have any concerns of physical injury?  
All(76) Politically (51) ID Theft (69) Male (41) Female (34) Victims of (5) 
 Conservative Liberal Victim Non-Victim  all w/o VCV Violent Crime 
28% 33% 36% 13% 32% 25% 29% 24% 28% 
Table 29.   Respondents who had a fear of physical injury from iris scanning 
Here we see that respondents did in fact believe that there was risk of physical 
injury from an iris scanner.  After being given a short explanation of how an iris scanner 
works, the level of fear seemed to diminish.   
However, the wording of the question left some real ambiguity as to how the 
respondent should answer. The question asked respondents to choose from the following 
possible answers: “Strongly Disagree”, “Somewhat Disagree” “Neither Agree or 
Disagree” “Somewhat Agree” or “Strongly Agree.”  This left the respondent to not only 
gauge their level of concern but then to decipher if agreeing meant they had some 
concern or  had no concerns.  If this survey were to be re-administered, the wording of 
this pair of questions should be corrected to ensure respondent choices are clear.  
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8. Awareness of Identity Theft Methods 
Respondents were asked: “Some individuals fraudulently assume the identity of 
other persons in order to engage in illegal acts.  To the best of your recollection, have you 
ever read or heard about people doing this in any of the following ways?” 
 
Question 32 §:  Respondents answering (77) Yes 2001 
To apply for government welfare payments to which they were not 
entitled 77% 50% 
To cash forged personal checks 83% 62% 
To use stolen credit cards 89% 72% 
To obtain a credit card in someone else's name 86% 62% 
To obtain unauthorized access to confidential computer files 66% 52% 
Table 30.   Responses to question 32, concerning awareness of identity theft 
compared to responses from the 2001 survey. 
This question only confirmed that individuals have indeed heard of identity theft 
and we see an increase in familiarity from the 2001 survey conducted by ORC. This 
could be due to increased media attention identity theft has received in recent years. 
 
Question 33 §: How serious a problem do you think this sort of thing poses today? 
Answer Options 
 77 Respondents answering Very Serious
Somewhat 
Serious Not Very Serious Not Serious at All Don't Know
I would say this problem is : 
  61 15 1 0 0 
Table 31.    Responses to question 33. 
Nearly all respondents felt that identity theft was a serious problem.  This was in 
line with the 2001 responses as well. 
9. Protection or Criminal Treatment 
The survey asked how respondents felt about the use of fingerprinting and iris 
scanning.  Did they feel these techniques treated the individual as a criminal or helped to 
protect individuals and the public from fraud? 
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Method of Biometric 
Respondent answering (75) 
Treats like a presumed Criminal Protects against fraud Don’t know 
Question 38: Fingerprinting 81% 7% 12% 
Question 40: Iris Scanning 64% 8% 28% 
Table 32.   Respondent answers to questions 38 and 40. 
These two questions reveal a difference in the ability of respondents to form an 
opinion concerning iris scanning, as over one-quarter of the respondent’s did not  know 
or were unable to decide if the method treated individuals like  presumed criminals more 
than it protected against fraud.  This could be due to the lack of familiarity with iris 
scanning as a practice or technology, but it might also be due to respondents feeling that 
it did both and were unable to pick one answer being the stronger impression or possibly 
that they could not choose one  response over the other. 
If this question was used in a future survey, it might be prudent to offer a fourth 
option of “Both.”  This would help to determine if individuals really did know or if they 
were torn between the two options.  
H. SURVEY RESULT SUMMARY 
One of the trends that seemed to be persistent throughout the survey results was 
that respondents were generally open to the idea of using biometrics to enhance the 
ability to establish or confirm the identity of individuals in situations where there was 
already a requirement to establish the identity of an individual.  It seemed possible to 
sway their opinion on certain situations if there was some sort of law enforcement angle 
added to the scenario (think of the sporting event question.)  
There was a much less of an open-minded attitude when either the application of 
biometrics would establish identity in new situations, or in particular, where biometric 
identification was being done without their knowledge.  The sporting event received the 
lowest level of support of the initial law enforcement scenarios. In the potential 
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commercial scenarios, when it was suggested that a store could use such technology to 
identify customers when they entered the store, the level of support was even lower. 
1. TWIC Implications 
Question 19 asked about an employer using biometrics to act as an “automated 
time-clock.”  Here we see a much lower level of support for such an idea than for other 
law enforcement and governmental applications of the biometric technologies.   
This result is probably the most significant result from the survey itself with 
regard to the TWIC program.  With a much larger sample set it would be prudent to add a 
question to ask the respondent if they worked at a job where they currently clock-in and 
out, or if they work in more of a salary or till the job is done occupation.  This might 
show even further opposition to this concept among the later group. 
Question 26 also indicated an overall mistrust of the U.S. Government to expand 
the use of any collection of biometric data beyond the original intended use.  This 
particular opinion is very strongly held by the ILWU and will need to be addressed if 
there is any hope of the ILWU acting in a supportive manner toward the TWIC program. 
I. FUTURE WORK 
In the end, the largest limitations to the value of the results of this survey ended 
up being an inability to say much about the respondents themselves and the relative low 
number of individuals who responded to the solicitation for participation.  While the 
subjects were not randomly selected from the general population, they provided a pool 
that was sufficient to evaluate the survey itself and provided general insight to public 
opinion. 
This lack of a random survey sampling leads to a potential for future work to 
repeat the survey, after improvement in some of the questions for clarity and more 
appropriate options for answers as indicated in section III.I.1. If repeated, it is 
recommended that a more formal method be used to acquire a more random sampling, or 
that a  more targeted audience be sought in order to be able to say something valuable 
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about that particular audience.  One such audience would be members of the International 
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), who will be directly effected by the TWIC 
program and its future implementation of biometrics as a means of identity verification.  
Throughout the results section there are suggestions for improvements to the 
questions that were asked and suggestions for additional questions that might help to 
further clarify some of the underlying indicative commonalities among individuals who 
were resistant to certain applications of biometrics. 
1. Suggestions for Improvement of this Survey 
Below are some suggested ways to improve this survey. 
a. Identification of Respondent Groups 
In a future application of this survey it is suggested that a better method of 
respondent recruitment be utilized that will ensure respondents from different 
advertisements for participation and/or different social groups can easily be identified.  
Two suggestions for this would be to use a different URL to collect responses for each 
group surveyed or to ensure that the groups are surveyed at different times such that their 
responses are easily identifiable, via the dated responses to survey. 
b. Further Classification of Victims of Violent Crime 
In future work it is also suggested that more information be collected from 
victims of violent crime.  It would be helpful to further classify the type of violent crime 
they experienced, specifically was the crime related to theft, mugging, car jacking – 
crimes where money was the apparent motivation for the violent crime, as opposed to 
those who experienced a violent crime where money was not the apparent motivation.  
This might further separate victims of violent monetary motivated crimes and their 
opinions of acceptability toward certain applications of biometrics.  
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c. Restatement of Purposes for Facial Recognition at a Sporting 
Event 
For future work, it might be prudent to ask this question four (4) in two 
different ways, with the second question tying the use of facial recognition in this 
scenario to look for “potential terrorists” rather than “fugitives of serious crimes.”  It is 
possible that under the auspice of protecting the public from a terrorist attack, this might 
be viewed as more acceptable.  
d. Additional Demographic Questions 
It might be possible to shed further light on apparent gender differences 
seen in question six (6) by adding a few demographic questions to this survey, to include 
asking if the respondent had children and the ages of those children. This might shed 
some insight as this could instead be a parental issue rather than a gender issue. 
e. Improve the Iris Education Effects on Safety Concerns 
Two questions were asked about the level of concern over physical harm 
due to iris scanning.  If this survey were to be re-administered, the wording of potential 
answers to these questions should be reworded to make the selection more appropriate to 
the questions.  The questions asked: 
Do you have any concerns of physical injury with the use of iris scanners? 
Respondents were provided with potential answers ranging from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree.  Answers presenting a range of “great concern” to “no concern at all,” 
would be much clearer.  
g. Criminal Treatment or Fraud Protection 
The survey asked how respondents felt about the use of fingerprinting and 
iris scanning.  Did they feel these techniques treated the individual as a criminal or helped 
to protect individuals and the public from fraud or didn’t know?  If this question was use 
in a future survey, it might be prudent to offer a fourth option of “Both.”  This would help 
to determine if individuals really did know or if they were torn between the two options.  
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h. Free Form Response to Explain Question 19 
Question 19 concerning the acceptability of using biometrics to protect 
large transactions made with credit cards produced a somewhat counter intuitive divide 
along lines of political affiliation.  It would be useful to add a freeform question to ask 
respondents to explain their reasoning.   
i. Add Comparative Rating Question 
It would also be interesting to add a question that specifically asks 
respondents if they would be more comfortable using iris recognition or fingerprint 
scanners if they are required to provide a biometric for identification purposes.  This 
might provide the ability to make additional recommendations to policy makers of 
individual government programs if the survey was administered to groups who would be 
required to comply with those individual programs.  
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IV. TEST OF PIER 2.3 IRIS SCANNER 
A. EXPERIMENT MOTIVATION 
This experiment was intended to test the reliability of a handheld iris scanner in 
field conditions.  While iris scanning is used in various scenarios around the world, they 
are typically deployed in office-like environments where the environmental conditions 
are fairly stable and there is an expectation of cleanliness.  A search of the literature 
found little data on the reliability of iris scanners in less than ideal conditions and 
operated by personnel who had received minimal training.  The eventual target of using 
iris scanners in the port environment would present conditions that could be far from 
ideal.  Compared with other biometrics, such as fingerprints or facial recognition; iris 
scanning would seem to have an advantage in these environments: even when a person’s 
hands are covered with gloves and the face is bundled up, the eyes (and the irises) are still 
visible. 
Most of the scientific evaluations of iris scanning utilize large iris template 
databases and a large number of iris templates collect via an iris scanner prior to the 
experiment itself.  The collected iris templates are then compared to the template 
database.  These experiments are often focused on the speed at which a particular 
algorithm can process large volumes of collected templates and the accuracy of the 
matches when presented with clean data. 
Iris scanners have been deployed to war zones in recent years [59] and have been 
used in conditions that are less that ideal, but there is little public information about the 
reliability of these devices in those scenarios.   
With the scenario of an iris scanner being used to confirm the identity of 
individuals seeking access to a facility, and the scanning to take place while these 
individuals were still in their vehicle, we set out to design an experiment that could test 
the reliability of a hand held iris scanner in such an environment.   
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This experiment utilized volunteers, both for the participants being scanned, as 
well as the individuals who operated the device.   This allowed us to assess the device 
from a somewhat technical standpoint of reliability as well as its ease of use.   
B. EXPERIMENT SET UP 
1. General Description of Experiment 
For this experiment we used a Portable Iris Enrollment and Recognition (PIER) 
2.3 handheld unit.  Volunteers were identified and registered using the PIER 2.3.  The 
PIER 2.3 operators were also volunteers who had some experience standing watch in 
military settings.  The week following registration the experiment was conducted.  
During the experiment, participants would drive onto the facility we used and, after 
receiving official permission to enter the facility, the participant would stop their vehicle 
near the scanner operator.  The scanner operator would then greet the participant and ask 
if it was okay to scan their iris. If given the go ahead, the operator would the attempt to 
scan the iris of the driver. 
2. Why this Location  
The FNMOC campus houses a workforce of approximately 600 personnel.  The 
physical layout of the ground allowed for volunteers to participate in the iris scanning 
experiment without leaving their vehicles while at the same time creating a low 
likelihood of blocking other automotive traffic seeking entry; thus presenting less 
disruption to normal facility operation.   
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) was chosen 
for three primary reasons: 
The physical location of FNMOC.  FNMOC is located in Monterey California 
and sits just over 1 mile from the shore line of Monterey Bay.  This location appeared to 
be ideal as it would likely provide weather conditions similar to those present at the gate 
of a typical port facility.  This was desirable for duplicating the target condition for 
conducting a field experiment of how reliably an iris scanner would function in 
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environmental conditions present at a port facility.  As mentioned in chapter one, the 
AAPA had voiced strong concern to the implantation of the TWIC program due to a lack 
of testing of biometric readers and TWIC card readers in the port environment [4].  It was 
hoped that the choice of FNMOC would provide a field experiment that met at least some 
of this particular concern.   As FNMOC is a gated facility, the iris scanner could be used 
on volunteers as they entered the facility and while they were still inside of their vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Map of the location of Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography 
Center (From Yahoo Maps) 
FNMOC is a fenced and guarded facility.  Individuals who seek entry to the 
FNMOC facility are required to stop at a guard shack and present identification to an 
armed guard prior to being allowed access to the facility.  This provided a pool of 
potential volunteers who were accustomed to being stopped prior to gaining access to a 
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gated facility.  We thought this pool of volunteers would be less likely than the general 
public to see the requirement to take an extra 20-30 seconds upon each entry to the 
facility as an unacceptable inconvenience.  FNMOC also presented an opportunity to 
have a pool of volunteers who would not need to go out their way to participate in this 
experiment.  Volunteers worked at this facility, and thus they would drive through the 
gate of the facility as part of their regular routine and participation in the field experiment 
would therefore require very little deviation from that routine. 
The experiment itself took place over one week; participants had their irises 
scanned each time they entered the facility during that week. There was concern that 
potential volunteers might not be willing to take the time required for briefing, IRB 
consent or debriefing even though the experiment itself had a minimal time requirement. 
The author had served a previous tour at FNMOC and had many friends and 
acquaintances that work at this facility. These personal contacts were important to the 
success of the experiment as we were limited in the amount of compensation we could 
provide to volunteers.   
3. Participants 
All volunteers were either members of the U.S. Navy, DoD civilian employees or 
DoD civilian contractors who were stationed or worked at Fleet Numerical Meteorology 
and Oceanography Center (FNMOC) in Monterey, California.  The scanner operators 
were also volunteers and were all active duty member of the U.S. Navy stationed at 
FNMOC. 
a. Biographic Breakdown 
There were a total of 25 volunteers who agreed to register their irises both 






Male 21 84% 
Female 4 16% 
Table 33.   Experiment Participant Gender 
c Eye Color 
Eye Color 
Blue 10 40% 
Blue-Green 1 4% 
Brown 7 28% 
Dark Brown 1 4% 
Hazel 6 24% 
Table 34.   Experiment Participant Eye Color 
d. Age Groups 
Age Groups 
20 – 29 8 32% 
30 - 39 4 16% 
40 - 49 6 24% 
50 - 59 6 24% 
60+ 1 4% 
Table 35.   Experiment Participant Age Groups 
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e. Wears Corrective Lenses 
Corrective Lenses 
Eye Glasses 7 28% 
Soft Contacts 3 12% 
Hard Contacts 1 4% 
Both 2 8% 
None 12 48% 
Table 36.   Experiment Participants Corrective Lenses 
4. How Participants Were Recruited 
Participants were sent an e-mail solicitation that had been approved by both the 
NPS IRB and the Executive Officer of FNMOC, sent from the Executive to all hands at 
FNMOC.  (See appendix B.)  This initial e-mail was intended to draw interested 
personnel to a presentation where they could learn about the experiment and what would 
be required of them.  This presentation was given on 29 Nov 2007 at FNMOC by the 
author to approximately 15 personnel who attended.  (Presentation is Appendix C.)  
During this presentation, potential volunteers were provided a brief history of the laws 
that had been passed (the ATSA and the MTSA) to bring about the TWIC program and 
how iris scanning might impact the deployment of the TWIC program. 
People who wished to volunteer were asked to sign up for a time slot later that 
day to return and have their irises registered into the system.  The experiment received 25 
volunteers in all. 
5. Why the PIER 2.3 
While looking at options for iris scanners to use for this experiment, one of the 
most important requirements was that the device had to be mobile and allow for quick set 
up and tear down of the unit as the experiment would take place during limited blocks of 
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time during the day. (This will be explained further in section IV.C – Experiment 
Method.)  There was also a desire to test a unit that would allow for maximum 
repositioning to fit the location of the driver both in reference to the device itself as well 
as the subject location within the vehicle.  
We also wanted to allow for the scanning irises of volunteers walking to work.  
This later scenario of a walking individual having their iris scanned was not initially part 
of the scope of the experiment, but some of the volunteers routinely walk to and from the 
FNMOC gated facility, in particular for lunch periods, so we needed to accommodate this 
scenario.  During visits to the Port of Oakland to see the actual conditions that an iris 
scanner would need to accommodate, we learned that at some facilities many of the 
longshoremen, who work exclusively on the waterfront, park outside of the port facility 
itself and then gain access to the port via a turnstile. Thus testing a subject on foot turned 
out to be a very appropriate scenario. 
The PIER 2.3 was chosen as it was a handheld iris scanning unit, its use in 
operational environments such as Iraq and it was identified as a having the best 
recognition image quality distribution of the units tested in the IRIS06 Iris recognition 
Study[44].  
The PIER 2.3 can be operated in a non-tethered configuration and this was seen as 
a positive for the purpose of this experiment.  This would allow for an individual to 
operate the system as opposed to a fixed unmanned unit, who could then record 
conditions or observations if and when the unit failed to recognize a participant. 
The Pier 2.3 is also a ruggedized unit that would withstand minor rough handling 
that might be experienced during the normal operation of the device while using it to 
collect iris scans of individuals who were seated inside of a vehicle during the scanning 
process.  The PIER 2.3 weighs just over a pound (16.5 oz) and can be used in the field 
with battery power and with no other cords attached.  This was anticipated to be 
advantageous as we did not how much flexibility in positioning the operator might need 
to get recognizable scans while the subject was sitting in a vehicle. 
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SecuriMetrics, the manufacture, was also kind enough to lend us a PIER 2.3 for 
the duration of the experiment.  This reduced the costs associated with the experiment 
and provided some additional flexibility for other un-anticipated expenses that might be 
encountered later on during the course of the experiment, survey or thesis research.   
C. EXPERIMENT METHOD 
1. How Participants Were Registered 
Step one of using any biometric system is to register users into the system.  For 
this experiment we registered volunteers at FNMOC later in the day after the 
informational brief about the experiment was given.  Registration of volunteers including 
the following steps: 
Volunteers were registered the week before the experiment.  Training of the 
operators took place that same day with the exception of a single operator who was 
absent that day.  That absent operator was trained on the following Monday by one of the 
other operators.  The field experiment of the PIER 2.3 took place the following week.  
There was very little time between registration and the field experiment itself. 
Volunteers read and signed a Privacy Act and Informed Consent form informing 
them of their rights and the experiment conductor’s responsibilities to the volunteer. 
Volunteers then filled out a Biographic Questionnaire to provide:  
• Eye Color 
• Gender 
• Age 
• If they wore corrective lenses, their prescription if they where willing to 
share it and/or knew it – most even if willing to share that information did 
not know it. 
• Any Eye conditions the subject currently or previously had experienced. 
Lasik surgery was the condition reported most often by those who 
reported a condition. 
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Volunteers were then provided an informational sheet that provided instruction on 
what would be expected of them to participate in the experiment and a reminder that they 
could excuses themselves from the experiment at any time. 
Attached to this informational sheet were two small green stickers with the 
volunteer’s subject number.  One of these stickers was to be placed on the windshield of 
their vehicle just above their DoD sticker to identify themselves to the scanner operator 
as a participant. 
 
Figure 9.   An example of the green sticker that was placed above the DoD stick on the 
volunteers’ vehicle to identify themselves as participants to the scanner operator.  
To excuse oneself from the experiment this stickers was simply removed. (image: 
Simon McLaren) 
Both their left and right irises were then scanned and registered in the PIER 2.3 
unit used for the experiment.  Subjects were registered in the system as Last name: 
SUBJECT, First name: J. 
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Figure 10.   Image of a registered iris after recognition.  All subjects for this experiment 
were named J. Subject and differentiated only by the Eye R ID and Eye L ID 
numbers. (image: Simon McLaren) 
The registration of volunteer’s irises took place in a typical office-like 
environment where light conditions were similar to what one would expect in such and 
environment.  This would not be the conditions that would likely be experienced at the 
gate when the volunteers would eventually be scanned to test the device, allowing a 
possible error in the experiment.  
This discrepancy between the registration conditions and the conditions at the 
time of the testing were allowed as this was a field test of the device.  This was also 
expected to resemble the real world if the iris scanning device were to be deployed at a 
gated facility where scanning takes place outdoors.  In this scenario, it would be most 
likely that the initial registration of the irises of a subject would take place in the comfort 
of an office, where the individual conducting the registration was likely to be located. 
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It would be impossible to register and individual in conditions that would be 
experienced at the time of recognition in a real world deployment as lighting conditions 
vary greatly during the day due to the position of the sun as well as due to the changes in 
weather conditions that will be experienced.  Thus the registration of the irises in office 
like condition was deemed to a very life-like scenario. 
2. The Spoiler 
One volunteer was chosen at random to not be registered in the PIER 2.3.  This 
volunteer placed the green sticker on their vehicle just like all the other volunteers.  This 
volunteer agreed to have their iris scanned each day during the experiment to allow for an 
opportunity for a false accept within the limits of our small sample set.  This was to 
simulate a scenario where someone who was not authorized to access the port was 
seeking access.  The question here was, “would the PIER 2.3 correctly fail to recognize 
this individual?”   
In the case of securing a facility via iris scanning, this would most likely represent 
the largest threat to the facility.  Those whom are registered in the system might also 
represent a threat, but in this case, the device should be expected to correctly recognize 
that individual and it would be up to the information stored in the registration database to 
then notify the operator that the individual was deemed a threat or to automatically deny 
the individual access to the facility or whatever asset the scanner was intended to protect.  
3. Scanner Operator Training 
In addition to volunteers that would allow their irises to be scanned we also 
recruited volunteers to operate the PIER 2.3 iris scanner during the week of the 
experiment.  Utilizing volunteers to operate the device allowed an opportunity to evaluate 
the ease of use and ease of training of the device. 
The thesis author was trained by Tim Johnson, Senior Sales Consultant for 
SecuriMetrics at their Martinez, CA office location.  Mr. Johnson provided a hands-on 
training session with the PIER 2.3 device, as well as a familiarization with the HIIDE 
series 4 (Hand-Held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment) device during the 
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training session.  SecuriMetrics also provided a DVD training video that included 
additional training on the use of the PIER 2.3. 
The four volunteer PIER Operators were trained the week prior to the field study 
via the SecuriMetrics Training DVD the day of the informational presentation and 
allowed a period of hands-on familiarization with the device.  One of the four operators 
was not present the day of training and the author decided to allow one of the three 
operators who had been previously trained to provide the familiarization training to the 
fourth operator without the benefit of the DVD.   
4. The Actual Experiment 
During the week of the experiment, Dec 3 - Dec 7, 2007, the PIER operators took 
positions at the entrance to the FNMOC facility.  Scanning subjects were instructed to 
drive onto the facility and, after receiving official permission to enter, the subject would 
stop their vehicle near the scanner operator. The scanner operator would then greet the 
subject and ask if it was okay to scan their iris. If permission was given, the operator 
would proceed to position the scanner the recommended 4” to 6” from the subject’s eye 
and attempt to collect a scan of their iris. 
• If the scan was successful the operator checked to see if the subject 
number displayed by the scanner matched the subject ID number on the 
subject’s placard. The operator also recorded whether the subject was 
wearing glasses or contacts and estimated the amount of time that it took 
to scan and identify the subject. 
• If the scanner failed to recognize the subject, the operator would record 
the same information and complete a short form recording any 
observations they noted that might have contributed to the failure to 
recognize. The operator would then try the scan again, and again would 
record the same information. The operators were told not to attempt to 
recognize a subject any more than three times on a single attempt to enter 
the facility. 
If a subject entered on foot, the procedure was the same with the exception of the 
subject standing still in front of the operator instead of sitting inside a car.  The operator 
recorded the same information about the attempt and success or failure. 
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5. Time Frame of the Experiment 
Scans were performed from 0730–0930 and from 1130-1330 on each day of the 
experiment, these times being chosen to match the morning commute and lunch hours of 
FNMOC.  This allowed for the possibility of scanning each subject at least twice each 
day, and increased the likelihood of being able to scan those subjects that usually arrived 
prior to 0730 in the morning on their return from lunch. 
These time frames led to one shortcoming of the experiment: it would have been 
informative to have included time outside of those time windows, as these windows did 
not provide an opportunity to test the device in low light or nighttime conditions.  Both of 
these light conditions are likely in any real world deployment of iris scanners to confirm 
or establish the identity of an individual seeking access to a gated facility.  These times 
are sure to be part of the routine at a port facility. 
6. Eyeglasses 
We tested subjects both with and without glasses.  Given the scenario of utilizing 
an iris scanner at a gated facility while drivers are still inside their vehicle, it is 
reasonable to assume that some drivers will be wearing eye glasses and would forget to 
remove them on occasion even if trained to do so.   
Subjects who wore glasses were instructed to remove them or lift them over the 
eyebrows to be scanned on day one and two.  Day three through five subjects who wore 
glasses were instructed to leave them on as the experiment attempted to determine how 
eye glasses affected the reliability of the device.  
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D. OBSERVED RESULTS 
1. Observed Failure Rates 
a. Failure to Register 
We did not experience any failures to register with any of the 24 
volunteers whom we attempted to register in the device.  However, we did experience a 
difficult time registering two of the subjects.  Both required multiple attempts to acquire 
acceptable images from at least one eye during registration. 
An acceptable image for registration is one that is at least 90% in focus as 
indicated by the focus bars on the PIER 2.3 device.  Below are two images that show an 
attempted recognition scan and two level of focus.  There are two focus indicators on the 
PIER 2.3 screen.  There is a green indicator bar on the left and one on the right of the iris 
image.  The left bar is used to indicate focus levels of 0-90% and the right bar indicates 
focus level of 90-100%.  An acceptable image is one that is at least 90%.  The second 
image shows an acceptable iris scan image. 
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Figure 11.   Above an iris is being scanned, note the green bar to the left of the image.  
The left bar indicated levels from 0 – 90% focus, with 90% being indicated by a 
green bar that extends the full length of the iris image.  (image: Simon McLaren) 
 
Figure 12.   The image above shows an acceptable iris image as indicated by the full green 
bar to the left of the iris image and partial green bar to the right of the iris image.  
These green bars indicate the quality of the imaging being captured. It is desirable 
to collect images where at least a portion of the right green indicator is visible. 
(image: Simon McLaren) 
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b. False Rejection Rate 
We experienced 6 false rejections out of 93 unique attempts, for a False 
Rejection Rate of 6.4%.  Out of 25 subjects, 11 (or 44%) experienced at least 1 false 
rejection on a first attempt.  
• Out of 100 attempts to recognize volunteers: 
• 93 attempts were of registered volunteers 
• 7 were of the spoiler  
Two of the 25 subjects experienced only false rejections.  Subjects 23 and 
26 were never recognized by the PIER 2.3. Subject 23 only attempted to be scanned once 
during the experiment and the device failed to recognize the subject on either the first or 
second attempt.  Subject 26 experienced a false rejection on the only attempt made to 
recognize him.   
Overall recognition and rejection rates are a bit difficult to determine 
given the freedom subjects had to refuse a second or third attempt after a false rejection.  
No common protocol was administered with respect to a second attempt always 
following a false reject on a first attempt and a third attempt always following a false 





Table 37.   Results of recognition attempts. 
c. Attempts with Contact Lenses  
Contacts lenses did not have a significant effect on the result of the 
experiment.  First attempt successes were slightly higher for individuals who wore 
contacts during attempted scans.   
Results of attempts on subjects who wore contacts during attempted 
recognitions: 
• 11 attempts recorded  
• 10 (91%) first attempt success  
• 1 (9%) failed to recognize on either first or second attempt; did not receive 
a third attempt  
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Due to the low number of attempts made at recognition of individuals 
wearing contacts, the results were not statistically significant. 
d. Attempts with Glasses 
Wednesday thru Friday there were 6 attempts made to scan volunteer’s 
irises while they wore their glasses.  Of those 6 attempts 3 were successful. Of the three 
that failed with glasses on, 1 was successful when the glasses were removed, 1 was 
unsuccessful when the glasses were removed the last trial did not receive a second 
attempt. 
e. False Acceptance  
We did not experience a single false acceptance or misidentification 
during our experiment.  All successful scans correctly identified the subject in question. 
f. Overall Analysis  
We believe that the FRR rate might be significantly improved through 
better training and monitoring of the operations. Many factors, including the angle of the 
device to the subject, have a critical effect on the performance.  
While the operators were provided the recommended training, on average 
each guard only operated the device for a total of five hours during the experiment.  It is 
likely that with continued use and a "refresher" training session to correct any incorrect 
operator tendencies, the observed error rates would decrease.   
Given the relative position of the operator (standing) to the subject (sitting 
inside of vehicle) it should be anticipated that it will continue to be more difficult to 
position the device at a "correct " angle than if the operator and subject are positioned 
with eyes at the same elevation.   
Our method did not remove trials from the results in cases where the 
operator may have incorrectly used the device (positioned the device at an angle too far 
off center or rotated too far from vertical) as this was a trial not only of the accuracy of 
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the device but an evaluation of how easy it was to learn to use the device.  A longer trial 
period would be better suited to evaluate the reduced FRR expected with increased 
operator "familiarity" with the device. 
The factor of the angle of the device relative to the subject is particularly 
relevant when scanning through eyeglasses, where management of that angle can reduce 
or eliminate the amount of glare or reflection cause by the eyeglasses reflecting both 
ambient light and the IR illumination of the device itself.  While SecuriMetrics has 
designed the PIER 2.3 IR illuminators to shine toward the eyes at an angle that does not 
usually produce any reflection in the direction of the PIER lens, the addition of 
eyeglasses, which the subject may not always wear in a manner where the lenses is 
perpendicular to the surface of the eye, has the potential to inadvertently reflect the IR 
illumination into the device’s camera lens.    
2. Observed Time to Scan 
Time-to-scan reported by the operators ranged from four to fifteen seconds, with a 
reported average of six seconds per scan.  This was an average of the time required to 
scan the participants as reported by the scanner operators.  An additional three to five 
seconds was then required for the scanner operator to visually verify the identity the 
scanner resolved to and the driver of the vehicle.   
Drivers were required to come to a complete stop for the scanning to take place.  
This added an additional 10 to 20 seconds to the entry time at the gate. However, drivers 
are presently required to stop and undergo and ID check with the guard manning the gate.  
If the scanning had been conducted by this guard, rather than by an operator at a 
secondary location, there would have been no additional time added by the stop itself.   
3. General Observations of Experiment Results 
Overall, the experiment went well considering the number of adverse issues we 
experienced.  
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a. Specific Subjects Who Experienced Low Success Rates 
Over half (13) of our subjects never experienced a false rejection during 
the field trial.  Out of the 52 attempts at recognizing these 13 subjects, all 52 attempts 
succeeded on their first try.   However, four of our subjects experienced false rejections 
requiring second attempts on 50% or more of their first attempts.  While some of these 
failures might be explainable by the environment, at least one subject commented that she 
“seemed to always get rejected” by the device.  This leads to some individuals, most 
likely based on physical attributes, experiencing false rejection more often than others.  
This is similar to the nondemocratic success of speech recognition systems that 
Doddington noted in 1998 [47]. 
b. Sunlight Backlighting the Subject 
One of the volunteers experienced a false rejection on the first attempt 
when they walked up to the operator.  The operator noted that the sun was directly behind 
the subject, which is a condition the manufacture trains the operator to ovoid.  A bright 
light behind the subject creates an image that is back-lit and can significantly reduce the 
quality of the image captured by the iris scanner.  The operator reported changing the 
relative position of the subject with respect to the sun and the second attempt result in a 
correct match. 
c. Sunlight in the Face of the Subject 
A second, unanticipated scenario occurred when the sun was low on the 
horizon and directly behind the operator.  This placed a good deal of bright light directly 
into the face of the subject and resulted in at least 3 false rejections.  The day 1 operator 
quickly adapted to this situation by placing his body between the sun and the subjects, 
thereby casting his shadow on the face of the subject on subsequent scans.  The 
adaptation eliminated the bright light in the faces of the subjects, and improved the 
success rate of the scanner.  The day 1 operator passed along his experience and solution 
to the rest of the operators, who then incorporated the solution when they operated the 
scanner. 
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There are three potential causes for bright light in the face of the subject 
causing increased false rejections. 
• Too little iris visible: The bright light in the face of the subject might have 
caused the subject to squint.  This would have resulted in a much greater 
portion of the iris being occluded, and there not being enough iris visible 
to the scanner to get a match. 
• Too much iris visible: The bright light in the face of the subject would 
likely cause the pupil of the iris to contract. This would have resulted in 
more of the iris being exposed, and there not having been enough of the 
iris visible at the time of registration to produce a match. 
• Glare: The bright light in the face of the subject might have produced a 
significant glare on the reflective surface of the iris.  This would have 
resulted in an occlusion of a portion of the iris in the image that was 
captured by the scanner. 
Regardless of the physical connection between the sunlight shining in the 
face of the subject, its affect on the pupil, eyelids, or surface reflection of the eye, and the 
impact on the image collected by the iris scanner; the solution was to block the source of 
light.  In an office environment the light source can be repositioned so it no longer causes 
interference.  This could be an issue in an outdoor mounted scenario where the iris 
scanner is collecting images of the iris at a distance. 
If the TWIC program were to use iris scanning, the issue of sunlight might 
be a problem.  The sun might be low on the horizon and shining directly into the faces of 
the drivers as they pass through the gate or are stopped to provide their job order to the 
port clerks.  To compensate for this it might be necessary to build a sun shield behind the 
iris scanner to prevent the sun from directly shinning too brightly into the face of the 
driver whose iris would need to be scanned.  
d. Relative Position of Operator and Subject 
The correct relative position of the scanner in relation to the subject was 
difficult to maintain given the relative position of the operator (who was standing) to the 
subject (sitting inside of the vehicle). In these relative positions, which are natural given 
the guard and subject in vehicle scenario, the operator must lower the device well below 
their own eye level to align the device with the eye of the subject. This results in either 
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the device screen being more difficult to see for the operator as they must now view the 
screen at an angle above or alternatively to keep the screen at an optimal view angle, this 
forces the operator to place the device in a position where the camera lens in no longer 
vertical.  Both of these scenarios become more pronounced as the relative eye elevation 
of the operator and subject become more uneven.   
This can create a situation were the surfaces of the eye and iris camera 
lens are no longer parallel to one another, the position in which the scanner works best.  
This “incorrect” or suboptimal position is further complicated by a subject who is unable, 
or unwilling to position their head in such a manner to help make these two planes 
parallel.  It may be physically difficult for a driver to both turn their head to the side 
while at the same time elevating their chin high enough to position their eye such that the 
surface is now parallel with the front surface of the scanner device. 
One method to overcome this would be for the operator to kneel or bend 
down to position themselves with their eye level more closely matching the eye level of 
the subject being scanned.  However, even if this were to reduce the error introduce by a 
mis-positioned scanner, it is hardly a comfortable solution for an operator. 
However, this is simply an observation from the overall results of the 
experiment, and no analysis has been done to determine the amount of error this less than 
optimum relative position of the operator and subject may introduce to the process. 
Another potential solution to this dilemma may already exist, the 2007 
Daugman algorithm discussed in chapter two.  This newer algorithm is supposed to 
handle this less than optimal position of the eye to the scanner, commonly referred to as 
an off-axis scan., although the term “off nadir” may be more appropriate. 
Our method did not remove trials from the results in cases where the 
operator may have incorrectly used the device (positioned the device at an angle to far off 
center or rotated too far from vertical) as this was a trial not only of the accuracy of the 
device but an evaluation of how easy it was to learn to use the device.  A longer trial 
period would be better suited to evaluate the reduced FRR expected with increased 
operator "familiarity" with the device. 
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The factor of the angle of the device relative to the subject is particularly 
relevant when scanning through eyeglasses, where management of that angle can reduce 
or eliminate the amount of glare or reflection cause by the eyeglasses reflecting both 
ambient light and the IR illumination of the device itself.   
e. Concerns About the Potential Physical Injury Iris Scanner May 
Cause 
During the recruiting phase for this experiment, I spoke with many 
potential volunteers and FNMOC as I toured the facility and spoke with friends and 
previous co-workers about possibly volunteering.  More than a few of those who 
volunteered were initially hesitant to participate stating they were concerned about 
potential physical injury the iris scanner might cause.  This fear was both about the 
potential for injury over even a short term exposure to iris scanning as well as the 
potential cumulative effects it might have.  This experience is not unique to our pilot 
study as usability study of biometrics with ATMs also encountered this concern [54].  
Some people remained concerned even after they were told that an iris 
scanner is really nothing more than a camera, and if they have ever played with a home 
video camera that has a night vision feature, they had been exposed to infra-red light 
similar to what the PIER 2.3 uses.  This concern highlighted the general unfamiliarity the 
public has with iris recognition and the potential to confuse it with retina scanning.  
While it is possible that some of these acquaintances were simply looking for a 
convenient excuse to not participate, it suggests that potential pools of subjects would 
need to be educated to overcome the possible misconceptions with regard to the minimal 
health risk iris recognition systems present. 
It also suggests that when introducing iris recognition to new groups of 
users who are previously unfamiliar with the technology, it could be prudent to avoid 
describing the process as “scanning.”  Scanning seems to intuitively imply that the body 
is being bombarded with some form of electromagnetic wave that “certainly” must pose 
some health risk – no matter what someone else tells you. 
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f. Concerns About Providing a Biometric to a Government Official 
Other non-participants interviewed expressed their concern of providing 
their iris template to a government official; even if it was just for a thesis experiment.  In 
spite of assurances that the iris template collected for the experiment would be destroyed 
at the end of the experiment, some individuals were still so cautious about giving up their 
“image” that it prevented them from participating. 
This highlights the mistrust some Americans have of their government.  It 
was somewhat surprising to see this mistrust from individuals who worked for and 
received their livelihood from the DoD.  This highlights the need to provide individuals 
who may be forced to utilize such devices with assurances of how their biometrics will be 
used.  Maybe more importantly, is the need to educate them on the consequences the 
government would face if their biometric data is used for a purpose other than which it 
was originally intended. 
The government can promise it will not misuse information collected 
about its citizens, but without educating those citizens on what safeguards are in place to 
prevent its misuse or loss, and what consequences await a government official who would 
knowingly use that information for another purpose, the government has little hope of 
calming those fears. 
g. Observations of the Training Methodology 
Following the experiment we were able to debrief the scanner operators.  
All noted that the training they had received was adequate and that the device was 
intuitive to use when being run in recognition mode.  The three operators who viewed the 
manufacture provided training DVD stated that the DVD based training provided ample 
visual demonstration, if not somewhat repetitive. 
All four operators felt that while the DVD training was nice, the hands-on 
training period was more useful as it allowed them to put what they had observed on the 
DVD to practice, and that by doing so made it much easier to remember than simply 
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watching a video.  They all felt that the hands-on training by itself was sufficient to learn 
how to use the device.  One operator did comment that the repetition in the training video 
was useful. 
h. Scanning Through Corrective Lenses 
Unfortunately, the experiment only resulted in six attempts to scan 
through corrective lenses (eye glasses).  Of the six glasses on attempts at recognition 
made, two attempts resulted in successful recognitions.   
Of the four attempts that failed through the glasses, two were successfully 
recognized when a second attempt to scan their eye was made immediately without the 
glasses.  One glass-on failure did not receive a second attempt without glasses.  This was 
one of the challenges that were observed with this field experiment, subjects were free to 
refuse recognition attempts at any time and for whatever reason.   
The last individual who experienced a failure with glasses on also failed to 
be recognized when a second attempt at recognition immediately followed without 
glasses.  This individual had been recognized before both with glasses on and without 
glasses. 
One of the operators did note that provided you did not have a glare on the 
surface of the glasses the device seemed to work well.  The author noted in pre-
experiment familiarization and during the registration process that the infra-red 
illuminators of the device itself could cause a glare on eye glasses.  This was usually 
overcome with relative ease by simply taking the iris scan at a slight left or right angle to 
the perpendicular of the glasses themselves. 
i. Usability of the PIER 2.3 
The operators of the PIER device provided very positive feedback 




operators commented on the touch screen interface and that they found it very “nice” to 
use.  However, all four operators, when specifically asked, provided recommendations to 
improve the user interface. 
4. Suggestions for Improvement of the PIER 2.3 from Operators 
The scanner operators were debriefed at the end of the experiment to gather 
feedback about their experience with the PIER 2.3 and possible areas of improvements to 
the device.  As with almost all users of “high tech” toys, when asked, have a lot of 
suggestions for improvement; and the operators for this experiment were no different.  
Here are the suggestions the operators provided: 
a. Single Button to Recognition Mode 
Since the device is used more often in recognition mode, (according to our 
operators) it would be useful to have a single button on the device that set the device in 
recognition mode directly and that did not require navigation of multiple menu options.  
The PIER 2.3 currently requires the operator to navigate to the recognition mode.  While 
this navigation only requires the operator to press two buttons or two equivalent touches 
of the touch screen, that requirement was found to be inconvenient particularly in 
combination with the next area of potential improvement. 
b. Longer Wait Prior to Auto Power Down 
The operators also noted that the timer on the device to power down 
automatically was set somewhat short.  The operators noted that during time of low gate-
crossing volume, the device would almost always power down between recognition 
attempts.  While the PIER 2.3 powers up in approximately 15 seconds, this additional 15 
to 20 seconds wait spent powering up and navigating to the recognition mode would 
nearly double the total time required to process a subject.  While the operators understood 
that the auto power-down feature was intended to extend battery life, they still found it to 
be inconvenient.  
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c. Screen Brightness and Reflectivity 
The operators also noted that at times the screen of the PIER 2.3 was 
difficult to see in bright sunlight and that this could be improved on to make the device 
more “friendly” in outdoor applications.  This suggestion of course also finds itself in 
opposition to extending the battery life of the device.  In bright sunlight this situation is 
further exaggerated by the reflectivity of the screen itself.  The operators also thought a 
low gloss screen would improve the ease of use in outdoor applications.  This 
combination became a considerable issue when the sun was directly behind the operator, 
with one operator stating that at times this prevented him from being able to see the 
screen well enough to “put the x on the eye” of the subject.  This may have contributed to 
the 26% first scan false rejection rate experienced. 
d. Reduce Required Proximity to Face 
The operators also mentioned that at times they observed subjects acting 
uncomfortable when the device was moved closer to their face in order to capture an iris 
scan.  The distance of 4”- 8” was often felt to invade the personal space of the subject 
being scanned.  This might be a cultural concern as Americans tend to expect a large area 
of “personal space” around their person than other cultures do.  One of the operators also 
commented “since when is security supposed to be comfortable. Maybe in this situation a 
little invasion of ones personal space is ok.”  
SecuriMetrics’ newer HIIDE Series 4 device has a focal length of 8 – 10 
inches, which reduces the intrusion into personal space the operator must make to obtain 
an iris image from the subject. 
e. Make it More Ruggedized 
One more possible improvement the operators provided would be to add 
“rubberized sides” to improve the grip of the device.  Along with the rubberized sides the 
operators also thought rubber stoppers on the backside of the device would also help to 
protect the PIER if it were laid down, particularly on a slick and slightly slanted surface. 
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5. Suggestions for Improvement of the PIER 2.3 From Author 
A few more possible suggestions for improvement of the PIER 2.3: 
a. Onboard Template Fusion 
One of the shortcomings of the device was evident only during the 
registration process.  Biometric Fusion, or being able to tie multiple biometric templates 
to a single record or body, was missing in the PIER 2.3.  With the PIER 2.3, each eye was 
registered and created a unique entry in the onboard database in the PIER 2.3.  If care 
was not taken during enrollment, it was possible to give the same body two names in the 
database, one for each iris.  SecuriMetrics does produces software for more robust 
template databases to be used in conjunction with the PIER 2.3 and other SecuriMetrics 
devices and this addresses the problem when the software is available on a desktop or 
laptop during registration.  SecuriMetrics has also addressed this issue in more recent 
handheld iris devices, but if a software upgrade were provided for the PIER 2.3, this 
would be an area for improvement. 
b. Faster Frame Capture Rates 
One possible cause for the high first attempt false rejection rate 
experienced in this experiment (26%) could be the frame rate of the device.  The current 
frame rate of 15 frames per second may introduce less reliability in capturing images that 
are in focus simply due to hand shake of the operator.  This potential effect would be 
greatly diminished for any stationary application of an iris scanner, but for handheld 
devices a faster shutter speed might help to improve first attempt successes.  This would 
not only offset hand motion, but could also offset motion of the subject being scanned. 
c. Image Stabilization of Camera 
A second option might be to add image stabilization similar to the type 
that has recently become available on even relatively inexpensive video and digital 
cameras.  Taken in conjunction with faster frame rates mentioned above, this could have 
a considerable improvement in image focus during capture. 
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d. Adjustable Angle View Screen 
In our application, the relative position of the operator (standing) to the 
subject (sitting inside of vehicle) caused some difficulty in correct positioning of the 
device relative to the subject.  This situation might be addressed by adding a view screen 
where its angle can be adjusted to allow a better view for the operator (similar to most 
video cameras), when the device is not used at the eye level of the operator.  In our 
scenario with the operator (standing) to the subject (sitting inside of vehicle) the 
operators often had to use the device in a position well below their own eye level.  This 
situation introduced some additional difficulty in proper alignment of the device relative 
to the subject’s eye that is not experienced when both subjects’ eyes are much closer to 
the same elevation.    
E. RELEVANCE TO THE TWIC USAGE SCENARIO 
1. Sunlight is a Factor 
One of the unanticipated discoveries of the experiment was the role sunlight 
played on the success of the recognition attempts when the sun was directly behind the 
scanner or individuals operating the scanner.  This situation put the sunlight shining 
directly into the face of the subject.  During this field trial we experienced considerable 
difficulty in this scenario.  The operators’ corrective action was to place their body 
between the sun and the subject, thereby casting a shadow over the face of the subject.  
This simple action resulted in at least three documented successful second attempts 
during the field experiment.   It is also likely this action contributed to many successful 
first attempt successes. 
When iris scanners are deployed to outdoor applications similar to the scenario of 
this field experiment, it will often be the case that it is cost prohibitive to undertake 
construction to redirect the direction of traffic to prevent the sun ever shining directly into 




to either place the iris scanner in a deferent location, if possible, or to provide a shade of 
some sort to block the sun from shining directly into the face of the subject being 
scanned. 
Possible solutions here would be to build walls between lanes of traffic to provide 
that shade, or to simply place a large sun-block behind the iris scanner in the form of a 
metal plate or other reasonable rugged sheet. 
2. Eyeglasses are a Factor 
This field experiment recorded some successes of iris recognition even when the 
subject did not remove their eyeglasses; however, this was more of an exception than  the 
rule.  Even though the experiment did not provide enough scans in this scenario to be 
able to make statements of statistical significance about eyeglasses, it is likely that the 
effect of glasses will be a factor in the deployment of iris scanner in any scenario where 
scans are conducted on subjects while they are in their vehicles.  Some drivers are unable 
to drive legally without wearing their eyeglasses and as such it should be expected that 
these drivers will be a part of the population to seek entry at any facility where iris 
scanning at the “gate” is implemented.   
This can be addressed easily enough through education and in the case of Ports, 
by reminders made by the gate guard or the clerk who processes the business transaction 
of the drivers, depending on where the iris scanner might be installed.   
F. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EXPERIMENT CHECK  
During the course of the experiment we were unable to test under a number of 
conditions that are likely to be experienced in any real-world manned or unmanned gated 
facility scenario.  While the PIER 2.3 would not lend itself to an unmanned application, it 
did provide some insight to the over-all gated facility application.  Eventually we would 
envision gated facilities utilizing an automated iris scanner that is designed to handle 
traffic much like the latest device which was introduced to the world by Sarnoff 
Corporation [25]. 
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It would have been more realistic to have attempted a field test of the Sarnoff 
solution [25], however as this device was only released in November of 2007 this was not 
possible as this field experiment was being arranged well before that time. 
We did not operate this experiment during times of low light conditions similar to 
those experienced during late evening or night time.  Many U.S. shipping port operate 
around the clock and any application of iris scanners at the gates of these facilities would 
need to operate under these conditions. 
Throughout the duration of this experiment we did not encounter periods of high 
humidity or dense fog or any other extreme weather condition.  For an iris scanner to be 
practical for deployment in the unmanned scenario to screen drivers at a gated port 
facility, it will need to operate 24 hours a day 365 day a year.  This will include extreme 
weather conditions including rain (light to heavy), fog (light to dense), snow, extreme 
winds, high dust levels and combinations of these.  These weather conditions are likely to 
present an issue for any iris scanning device, but particularly a mounted and unmanned 
device that cannot be “brought in from the rain”, so to speak, when the weather 
conditions are less than favorable. 
During the experiment, we operated the PIER 2.3 in a one-to-many identity 
establishment mode.  The TWIC program is intended to utilize the TWIC card to provide 
a claimed identity and use the biometric device to verify that identity with respect to the 
individual who presented the TWIC card.  We did not test in this configuration, but it 
would seem to be less demanding than the one-to-many scenario. 
This pilot experiment was conducted with a very limited pool of 25 individuals 
with two iris templates for each (except the spoiler).  Any real-world application will 
need to handle hundreds or thousands of templates.  We did not simulate this level of 
templates as potential mismatches.  While research indicates that these vastly larger 
numbers do not significantly increase the likelihood of false accepts [41], it would still be 
prudent to test this in field conditions. 
This experiment took place over a short time period of two weeks.  It would be 
prudent to conduct an experiment that covered a much more significant period of time. 
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False rejections did not all receive the same level of follow-up attempts. This was 
often due to the flow of traffic or the impatience of the test subject.  A more uniform 
handling of false rejects might have provided a better understanding of multiple attempts. 
During this experiment one individual served as both the operator and recorder.  
This occasionally placed the individual in a position to have to choose between providing 
detailed notes and scanning the next subject in the queue. 
G. FUTURE WORK 
1. Experiment Improvements 
A follow-up experiment could be improved in the following ways: 
• Improved application of a standard protocol when it came to handling first 
and second attempt failures.  It would be beneficial to ensure as much as 
possible to ensure all recognition attempts received an equal number of 
attempts at recognition before being called a false reject. 
• Test the device in low-light conditions such as those found during dusk to 
nightfall and during the night time.  This would provide an understanding 
of how dilated pupils might affect the efficiency of the device.  Again, 
registration should be done in atypical office-like conditions and the full 
range of outdoor lighting conditions should be tested. 
• A repetition of this experiment would be better suited toward using the 
new Sarnoff “Drive-Through” system [25] or a similar device.  This will 
provide an evaluation of an unmanned solution as this would most like be 
the type of device desired at a gated facility. 
• Testing of the device in extreme weather conditions to include rain, snow, 
fog, dust, high winds and combinations of these.  Unmanned, mounted 
devices should be tested by allowing them to remain exposed to these 
conditions for prolonged periods to mimic the 24/7, 365 days a year 
operations of many U.S. shipping ports to ensure the devices are both 
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durable and can indeed operate in such weather conditions.  During any 
prolonged exposure to the elements, any mounted device is likely to 
experience film build up of dirt and grime from oil sourced in the facility, 
as well as snow and ice build up during winter conditions. These scenarios 
must be fully tested with favorable results (or at least more favorable than 
alternative biometric options) before iris scanners could be the solution of 
choice for this scenario. 
• The device should be tested in an identity establishment mode as well as 
an identity verification mode. 
• There is opportunity to design a proto-type for interfacing the TWIC card 
to provide a claimed identity and the device to verify that claimed identity. 
• This experiment should be repeated with hundreds of thousands of iris 
templates loaded into the database to simulate the large number of 
templates likely in a real-world deployment of iris scanners. This could be 
accomplished by preloading the template database with other “real” 
templates. These are available. 
• This sort of field experiment should test the stability of the irises test 
population over a longer period of time.  A time frame of three years 
would be sufficient to show that the iris is stable under fielded conditions.  
Beyond this time frame would not be necessary, as the TWIC card itself 
must be renewed on a regular time frame (five years) and the digital ID’s 
on the card must currently be renewed every three years.  These events 
both present opportunities to collect a new biometric template at regular 
intervals, even if some individual have less stable iris patterns.  Although 
this is not expected to be an issue, as the iris tends to achieve stability very 
early in the development of the human body [48]. 
• In a repeated experiment, it would also be wise to monitor the operators to 
look for operator actions that introduce error and reduce the accuracy of 
the device during capture of the iris image. 
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• It would also be prudent to conduct the experiment with an additional 
“record keeper” who would record event and notes on conditions that 
might contribute to false rejections.  This would most likely result in more 
detailed notes about false rejections.  During this experiment, one 
individual served as both the operator and recorder.  This occasionally 
placed the individual in a position to have to choose between providing 
detailed notes and scanning the next subject in the queue.  
• Replacing the PIER 2.3 with the SecuriMetrics HIIDE device to test the 
affects of the newer Daugman 2007 iris recognition algorithm on the off 
nadir alignment that seemed common when the relative eye levels of the 
operator and subject were different. 
Many of these recommendations could be easily fingerprint scanning.  In the 
future, DHS or some other organization might try to directly compare different biometric 
technologies before issuing recommendations mandating a specific technology.  
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF OBSERVED RELIABILITY OF PIER 2.3 
Overall we were very pleased with the PIER 2.3 device and felt it performed very 
well in our pilot field study. While we experienced a higher False Rejection Rate than is 
common for iris recognition devices; this was most likely due to operator actions.  We 
did come across two conditions that seemed to increase the overall False Rejection Rate 
experienced during the field experiment.    
We experienced conditions where the sun was low on the horizon and positioned 
behind the back of the PIER operator.  This allowed the sun to shine brightly and directly 
into the faces of the subjects being scanned during the morning hours of the experiment.  
The result was an increased occurrence of false rejections.  This could be due to direct 
effects of sunlight, i.e. reflecting of the surface of the eye or constricting of the pupil 
resulting in exposure of more iris surface to the camera.  It could also have been a been 
due to less direct effects of the direct sunlight, squinting by the subject in reaction to the 
direct sunlight, reflection of the screen of the PIER 2.3 view screen making it more 
difficult to properly align the device to capture an iris image, or any combination of these 
direct and indirect effects.  
Regardless of the link between the direct sunlight into the face of the subject 
being scanned, the solution was to block the direct sunlight by casting a shadow over the 
subject’s face and the view screen of the PIER 2.3 device.  In this experiment this was 
accomplished by the PIER 2.3 operator repositioning their body to cast that shadow. 
A second potential cause of the increased False Rejection Rate may have been 
ergonomics and relative position of the operator with respect to the subject.  When the 
PIER 2.3 was used to obtain an iris image of a subject that was sitting in a low vehicle, 
this placed the operator and the subject’s shoulders at different elevations.  This in turn 
meant that as the operator lowered the PIER 2.3 in their hand to the level of the subject’s 
eye, the hand followed an arcing motion which caused the PIER to no longer be in a 
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vertical position.  In some cases, the subject inside the vehicle was able to tilt their own 
head in such a way as to maintain proper alignment between the PIER 2.3 and their eye.  
In other cases the subjects were either unaware of the need or physically unable to 
achieve the required relative alignment.  The newer Daugman 2007 iris recognition 
algorithm may be able to compensate for this misalignment, as it’s specifically intended 
to “correct” for off nadir scans of the iris. 
Both of these issues could have an impact on future deployments of iris scanners 
to screen drivers of vehicles while they are still inside of their vehicle.  While an 
unmanned application of an iris scanner may address the sunlight reflection of the view 
screen issue, it would still be vulnerable to the effects of the direct sunlight on the 
subject’s iris itself and increased squinting.  In addition a fixed mount iris scanner is 
likely to further complicate the relative positioning and alignment of the scanner and the 
iris in scenarios where vehicle height is variable as might be expected at a port facility 
where both passenger vehicles and tractor-trailers must be screened at the same gate. 
B. SUMMARY OF BIOMETRIC ATTITUDES SURVEY 
The Biometric Attitudes Survey indicated three important issues for consideration 
by policy makers:  
1. No Biometrics Where Identification is Not Currently Required  
The survey showed a rather high degree of support of the use of biometrics in 
scenarios where positive identification is required today, such as gun sales and traffic 
stops. The introduction of biometrics into these scenarios only changes the method by 
which that identification is presented.  None of these scenarios introduced a new 
requirement for positive identification. 
Facial recognition received lower levels of support in general than fingerprint 
identification.  This may very well be due to the perceived clandestine nature by which 
facial recognition works.  From both the qualitative survey results and the opened 
comments, individuals seem opposed to not being able to control the presentation of their 
identities.  The 2001 survey conducted by Opinions Research Corporation [15] strongly 
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suggested this, with 95% of their respondents finding it important that “an individual 
should be told whenever his biometric identifier is being collected – it could not be 
collected secretly” except in national security situations. Individuals also seem to desire 
the ability to maintain some level of anonymity in scenarios where their identification is 
not required by today’s laws. 
Survey respondents found the scenarios that suggested the use of biometrics to 
establish identity where it is not already required today, to be significantly less 
acceptable.  This would seem to strongly indicate that the perceived invasion of privacy 
takes place mainly when there are attempts made to identify individuals in scenarios 
where they are able to be anonymous under current requirements. 
2. Individuals Do Not Trust the Government 
Only 22% of individuals who responded stated they trusted the U.S. Government 
to not misuse biometric data it collects.  This seems fitting with the tradition of 
Americans throughout our history.  Our founding fathers sought to limit the power of 
government and in particular our federal government.  It could be that this tradition still 
holds strong today and that most Americans do not trust the government to stay with in 
its bounds. 
Opinions Research Corporation found that 97% of it respondents thought it was 
important that “An organization collecting biometric IDs should not use them for any 
other purpose other than those originally described to the individual, unless required to do 
so by law or each person in the system has been informed and given their consent.” [15] 
One way to address this is for the government to educate the public on the 
penalties a government official will face if these collected biometrics are misused.  The 
public is not likely to trust the government unless they understand the incentive 
government officials have to live within the law. 
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3. Do Not Tread on Spiritual Beliefs 
Many survey respondents indicated they held strong religious beliefs that the 
Biblical “Mark of the Beast” is real, and will come to fruition at some point in the future.  
Many have a strong fear of biometrics fulfilling that prophecy.  Regardless if these 
people are right or wrong, consideration must be given to those individuals who have 
those beliefs.  With specific regard to the “Mark of the Beast”, care must be taken to 
understand what these individuals are likely to interpret as fulfillment of prophecy, and 
policies that would “fit” should be avoided. 
In the Bible, the Mark of the Beast is described as the addition of some form of 
identifying mark to the individual.  In contrast, biometrics are the measure of what an 
individual is already, i.e. individuals already posses their biometric at birth.  
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
1. Avoiding the Mark of the Beast 
“I think of it as fulfilling prophecy from the book of Revelations in the Bible.”  
This was one response from the survey respondent when asked if they had any moral or 
religious concerns about the use of biometrics.  Another respondent replied, “I tend to 
view it as inevitable.  Human nature being what it is/prophecies having been made 1000's 
of years ago, I know they will eventually be greatly misused.” A third responded, “Only 
if a device is imbedded into the forehead or wrist for identification.”   
All of these responses are clear references to the Revelations 13:16-18, which 
indicates that all people on the earth will be required to take the “Mark of the Beast” to be 
able to function in society during the period referred to as the “Great Tribulation” that is 
prophesied to take place during the last seven years of life as we know it on earth.  
Revelations 13: (v16) And he causeth all, both small and great, rich and 
poor, free and bond, to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their 
foreheads: (v17) And that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the 




wisdom. Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast: 
for it is the number of a man; and his number is Six hundred threescore 
and six. (King James Version) 
One clear implication here for future governmental policy surrounding the use of 
biometric and other identification programs is the need to take proactive action to avoid 
the program being viewed in the context of the “Mark of the Beast.”  The description of 
the mark in the Bible indicates that it will be “in their right hand, or in their foreheads.”  
Given that a recent Time/CCN poll “found that 59% of Americas believe the events in 
Revelations are going to come true”, [60] creating government policy today to prevent 
the use of these two areas of the human body from being used for identification purposes, 
might go a long way to minimize the concerns of those individuals who believe strongly 
in a literal interpretation of this portion of the Bible.  This might have a larger implication 
with RFID implanted chips than biometrics, or implanted RFID chips used in 
combination with biometrics, but even so great consideration must be given to those who 
believe. 
2. Limit New Identification Requirements 
The Biometrics Attitudes survey showed that respondents tended to find the use 
of biometrics to confirm or establish a person’s identity to be acceptable when it was 
used in a scenario that requires positive identification today.  Examples include 
interactions with law enforcement, firearm sales and access to classified information.  
When the scenarios described included the use of biometrics to establish an individual’s 
identity in scenarios that are not required today, there was much greater level of 
resistance to such applications. 
This suggests that policy makers should look to use biometrics to help enforce 
current legal requirements before looking for “new” applications of strong identification 
in society. 
 108
3. Clearly State Biometric Data Protection Policy and Penalties 
The concerns voiced by the ILWU representative about possible use of biometric 
data in ways not originally intended are hardly unique.  The ORC survey demonstrated a 
clear public sentiment that government is likely to expand the use of any data it collects 
beyond its original intended purpose.  One thing the survey of attitudes and comments 
from respondents made clear it that individuals are less concerned with the technology of 
biometrics than they are with it potential uses. The majority of the survey respondents to 
not trust that government will not “misuse” this information.  However, there is no 
definition of what is “misuse.”  Some suggest that any use beyond the stated specific 
purpose would be misuse; others would be more open and allow for some degree of 
expanded use. Almost all agree that at some point the information could be used in an 
unacceptable manner. 
To avoid public outcry and objections to the actions of government, our elected 
officials may need to take action to define what acceptable uses of biometrics are by 
enacting laws that prevent “mission creep” of biometrics, and limiting the uses to only 
those uses that subjects were informed of and agreed to at the time of collection.  This 
seems to be even more important as a limitation of government programs and their use of 
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